


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
NUMBER 1

SOCIAL EDUCATION



Special Issue on the Middle East

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE SOCIAL STUDIES
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
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

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Building blocks of American history

Rise of the American Nation, by Lewis Paul Todd and Merle Curti, is divided into *parts*, the parts into *units*, the units into *chapters*, and the chapters into *sections*. The last division is the smallest one of formal organization, but like many small things it is of surprisingly great importance.

The reason for the importance is that each section presents a single, significant idea in American history. For instance, in a chronological chapter describing the creation of our federal union, one section takes up the idea, "State delegations reach agreements and compromises," and in an analytical chapter portraying how the colonists became Americans is the section titled, "The frontiersman becomes the first true American."

Sections might be considered building blocks, for each one is an idea that has been molded and shaped by the authors so that its surfaces join with the surfaces of sections adjoining it. Also, like a building block, each section has a definite shape. All the sections have a beginning, a middle, and an end. The beginning introduces the section idea and relates it to the previous section, or to the chapter introduction, through the use of a transition. The middle expands and explores the idea, always carefully relating it to the theme of the chapter. The end sums up the section idea and relates it to the next section through a transition.

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Editor's Page

WORLD IN TRANSITION¹

*The moving finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on: nor all your piety nor wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a line.
Nor all your tears wash out a word of it.*

—OMAR KHAYYÁM

TWO SUMMERS AGO we spent five weeks in Saudi Arabia on an assignment for the Arabian-American Oil Company, usually referred to as Aramco. This brief visit hardly qualifies us to speak with authority about the

oil-rich Kingdom of Saud, much less about the tortured complex known as the Middle East, but it did leave us with a number of unforgettable impressions and a host of questions for which we have no answers.

Our most vivid impression is that the big story in Saudi Arabia is not oil. The big story—and we suspect this applies in one way or another to the entire Middle East—is one of human relations, of a people whose way of life remained relatively unchanged for hundreds of years and who now, in a brief span of two or three decades, suddenly find themselves plunged into the swirling tides of the modern world. The problems created for both the Saudis and the oil men are ones, it is reasonable to assume, neither anticipated when

¹This editorial has been drawn, with some revision, from a considerably longer statement prepared nearly two years ago for the *Civic Leader* (May 11, 1959). We are grateful to the Civic Education Service for permission to use the copy in its present form.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The cover

The cover picture (UNESCO-Laurenza) shows the Pavilion of Trajan half submerged under the waters behind the present Aswan Dam. This Pavilion stands on the Isle of Philae, near Aswan. The temples of Philae are the creation of several dynasties, including the XXXth under Nectanebo I, around 360 B.C. They were continued by the Ptolemies and finished under the Roman occupation in the first and second centuries A.D. The new High Dam now being constructed presents an even greater threat to the Isle of Philae and hundreds of other historic treasures in the Nile Valley.

The map

The map on pages 10-11 originally appeared in color in a recent issue of *Senior Scholastic* (October 19, 1960) featuring the Middle East. We are indebted to the editors of Scholastic Magazines for generously permitting us to reproduce the map in modified form.

The American Association for Middle East Studies

This issue of *Social Education* has been prepared in collaboration with Executive Secretary Henry Siegman of the American Association for Middle East Studies. We here express our appreciation for this cooperation and for a grant that has made it possible for us to include additional pages in the journal.

Three of the articles that appear in the following pages—those by Professor Douglas D. Crary, Professor C. Ernest Dawn, and Professor Herman Finer—are based on papers presented at the Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs held last February at the University of Minnesota. This conference was sponsored by the Minnesota Council for the Social Studies in cooperation with the Minnesota Council for Geographic Education and the American Association for Middle East Studies.

they signed what on the surface seemed to be a simple agreement to develop a natural resource buried beneath the desert. The technical problems involved in developing the oil fields in a remote part of the earth and in a forbidding physical environment have been enormous, but they are as nothing compared with the problems which have emerged at that point where the Arab and the modern world have come into contact for the first time.

Take, for example, the Bedouin who was having his initial ride in a truck and, knowing nothing of speed, walked off the truck while it was moving at 40 miles an hour. Or take the Arab who was experiencing his first flight in one of the planes of the new Saudi Airline, and who built a fire in the aisle to boil water for a cup of tea. These instances did occur, and more than once, we were told, as recently as ten short years ago. But lest one be tempted to draw invidious comparisons, let it be quickly added that the Arabs learn as rapidly as anyone else and that the same man who walked off the moving truck may now, if he survived, be driving a huge piece of automotive equipment with complete skill and assurance.

Arabs make up the great majority of all the workers in the oil fields today. One sees Saudi doctors in the Aramco hospitals, Saudi teachers in the training schools, Saudi engineers and technicians working side by side and with equal competence with men who grew up and went to school in the United States.

In its original agreement, Aramco promised to train the Saudis for positions of responsibility throughout the entire operation. As part of the training program, the company operates schools that the Saudi workers attend on company time and with full pay. Evening schools provide additional opportunities for ambitious young Arabs. Through the years these schools have provided an increasing number of Arabs with the equivalent of an elementary school education plus some background in mathematics and in technical subjects. Moreover, the company has sent a growing number of the ablest young men for further education outside of Saudi Arabia.

But training for competence in a new vocation does not solve the Arab's social problems. On the contrary, he now finds himself astride two ways of life—one old, the other new—and the resulting conflict at times becomes almost more than a man can bear. Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate what we have in mind is to put it in terms of a single individual.

In his book, *Big Oil Man from Arabia* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1958), Michael Sheldon Cheyney, a former Aramco employee, devoted several pages to a young man to whom, in order to protect his identity, he assigned the name Salah. We checked on this story when we were in Arabia, found it was true, and, by way of further confirmation, met and talked with several young men whose disturbing life stories differed from Salah's only in more or less irrelevant detail.

Several years ago the boy, Salah, came out of the desert and took his first job in the oil fields. Even a brief summary of his experience provides an insight into the revolution that is convulsing Saudi Arabia today and that will in time transform the lives of every man, woman, and child in this desert kingdom.

Salah started as an office boy. He made the most of his opportunities, and did so well that after a few years the company selected him as one of a number of Saudis to go to the United States to teach Arabic at the training center then being conducted on Long Island for Americans preparing for service in Arabia. Salah apparently liked every minute of his stay in America. He devoured American history, traveled as much as possible, reveled in the freedom and independence of the democratic way of life, and even fell in love with an American girl. But the time came when he had to return to Arabia.

He is doing well as far as his work is concerned, but he is a completely disillusioned and unhappy young man. His own family no longer understands him, nor does he understand them. He enjoys the associations with his new American friends during the day, but when the whistle blows at night they go their separate ways—the Americans to their homes and families, Salah back to his single room, comfortably furnished to be sure, but only a cell for a man whose expectations have grown beyond the life of his boyhood days. Salah frets at the rigid social rules of the world in which he grew up. He is, in brief, a man suspended between two worlds, without real roots in either. This frustration makes Salah and others who share his fate ripe for revolution.

But we shall miss the point of this story completely if we do not bear in mind that Salah is only one of the countless number of youths living in the underdeveloped areas of the world facing the breakup of old traditions and confronting the problem of reconstructing their entire system of values. There is no parallel to this situation in the long course of human history. What becomes

(Concluded on page 52)

The Middle East and World Tension

Herman Finer

BETWEEN the advent of Hitler and the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet Union's diplomats gave continuous currency to the admonition: "Peace is indivisible." They meant that there is in the world today a linkage among the nationalisms that, if made red-hot at any point, might produce war all through the chain. The idea has become even more valid since World War II, and above all, through two novel circumstances: the intensification of nationalism and the production of nuclear weapons projectable over a seven-thousand mile range, with accuracy, moving that distance in half an hour.

There are many areas of the world so disturbed and at the same time so strategically located, that war there might very well mean war all over the world involving the use of H-bombs by the great powers. Among such areas the Middle East is perhaps first, and certainly very high, in inflammability.

The area, comprising Turkey, Syria, Iraq (perhaps Iran), Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt, constitutes a danger to the world for reasons which, for convenience of exposition, may be included in two categories: its geo-strategic importance and its inherent political instability. Elsewhere in this publication there is an analysis of the internal politics of the region. This discussion will, therefore, examine only the factors comprised in the former category.


GEO-STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF MIDDLE EAST

The strategic importance of the Middle East—or to put it in another way—the ingredients of its concrete power in the balance of power among

nations, is in (a) its geographic location and (b) its resources that are needed by other nations. Geographic (sometimes called geopolitical) strength is the mere effect of location. The resources of the Middle East are as yet, despite the oil resources, extremely meager. By themselves, the produce of on the whole rather primitive agricultural occupations could not establish armies and armaments of any importance in the modern world, nor advance lethal scientific and technological achievements. But decisive strength is derived from mere location, if that location is needed to support the survival of other nations, or their expansion in world dominion. The rulers of some of the Middle Eastern states, particularly the ruler of Egypt and the Suez Canal, are in a position to impose their will on other nations because they can vitally affect the balance of power between them at a time when that balance is precarious and, above all, when its disturbance may force the outbreak of a war among them, in all probability a war total in area and in weapons.

For the U.S.S.R., the Middle Eastern nations constitute a southern barrier to attack of its territory via Bulgaria, across the Black Sea, into the Ukraine, or in the area of Baku and Batum. It is even a bridge across which conventional weapons and men could move into the Ukraine, which, ethnically and by tradition, is the "soft underbelly" of Russia. Bases on this Middle East territory—for example, in Turkey—threaten the existence of Moscow itself, and all the intervening vital industrial, farming, and populous area, by intermediate range missiles. In the U-2 incident, the bases in Turkey figured as a take-off ground. They can threaten the oil supplies of the Caucasus and Georgia; and Soviet agriculture, no less than Soviet industry, and all its carefully formulated long- and short-term plans, have come to depend on them. The Soviet rulers are, therefore, much beholden to the rulers of the Middle East for one very serious aspect of their survival. They are tempted to intervene, to in-

Dr. Finer is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Among his books, many of which have become classics in the field, are *America's Destiny* (Macmillan, 1947) and *The Presidency* (University of Chicago Press, 1960).





timidate or overthrow them through native but foreign-inspired rebellions.

This is the defensive side of Soviet needs. But Russia pursues a policy of dynamic overthrow of "bourgeois" and "imperialist" rule throughout the world, in part disguised as "peaceful co-existence." Her empire is to be world-wide in the name of Marx and Lenin. For her, the Middle East is the bridge to the Far East via Pakistan and Afghanistan (Moslem countries), and via Egypt and the lesser kingdoms of the south Arabian peninsula into Africa.

In a sense, the American interest in the Middle East, from the geopolitical point of view, is deterrent. In spite of the occasional accusations that American oil-interests compel the State Department to exert power to safeguard their investments, the far more fundamental interest of the U.S.A. in the Middle East is to obtain bases from which to exert a deterrent influence on Soviet Communistic dynamism everywhere, the more as the Soviet has pushed this as far westward as Cuba, less than half an hour from America's mainland shores. The strategic Air Command has its bases in Turkey, in Dhahran, in Saudi Arabia, further south in Ethiopia, and west in Libya and Morocco, to speak of this part of the world only. This is a most tremendous force for the peace of the world and the survival of America's allies and friends. Where would Turkey herself be today, if not for America's presence in the Middle East? What would have happened to Greece if, in 1947, the Truman Doctrine had not been formulated and implemented? What then would have happened to recalcitrant Tito, and to Italy, with Albania, a Soviet base, as a thorn in her side?

Now, it has been advanced that in the present age of push-button war carried out by means of intercontinental ballistic missiles, areas like the Middle East are not necessary to America's security, for the two giants of the East and the West could destroy each other by weapons launched from their homelands. What, then, does a few miles of land, more or less, matter? The idea is fallacious. Home-based missiles can be destroyed by a surprise attack. Enough bases for retaliation must be possessed so that not all one's forces are wiped out beyond the possibility of subsequent destruction of the enemy. Hence, not less but *more* territory is required as the consequence of modern weapons. Even the seas are invoked to provide mobile and less exposed bases, by means of submarines armed with such

missiles as the Polaris. But these, also, are vulnerable in many ways to interception and destruction. They are additional assurance, not substitutional safeguards. Safety lies in the maximization of the number and variety of bases for missile and airplane attack, whose still great potentiality is revealed by the history of U-2 incursions into Russia and more recently the testing of planes that move at nearly twenty-five hundred miles an hour at altitudes inaccessible to anti-aircraft fire.

Hence, the importance, indeed, the indispensability of all bases possible, including those in the Middle East: to secure them for one's self, to deny them to the most dangerous potential enemy, particularly the one who has been threatening rocket attacks on every nation with which he has even a minor quarrel. It cannot be lost from sight that Soviet doctrine since early 1956 in official terms is that the Soviet Union is no longer encircled by capitalist enemies, but that she herself encircles the U.S.A. Would it not be true to say that the nation that holds half the world in its territorial grip holds the whole world in its grip, to dictate policy as it alone decides?

Britain's position, in the nineteenth century and until the middle 1930's dominant in the Middle East, has declined, and her bases were lost to the West; she has been forced to move as far away as Kenya and Cyprus. American strength has entered to take up the slack.

While American statesmen and active-minded citizens might like to see democratic institutions and civil rights operative in the countries of the Middle East, they have no such imperializing or missionarizing will in this regard to compare with Russian determination to have the whole world operate according to its peculiar system of "democracy." Their prime aim is their own security and that of their friends; to prevent a third world war; and, in addition, they have benevolent, even altruistic, intentions so far as Middle East economic improvement is concerned.

No party to national survival regards the surrender of any toe-hold in the Middle East with complacency. A base lost might be a nation lost. Therefore, any threat by one side against the other is a cause for alarm and almost for mobilization. Therefore, the ruler of any one of the Middle East nations may, by any personal and emotionally-unstable act or word, embroil the great powers. He will be protected in provocations to the uttermost limit by his friends in the

United Nations where the small nations, many of them new, will ward off retribution against him, since it is the kind of treatment they would not like for themselves. On the other hand, as the Suez affair showed only too clearly, the most stubborn and ill-willed dictator can defy the United Nations, especially when supported by the Soviet Union.

The interest of the U.S.A. since the end of World War II in the area has increased with the desire to link up the "northern tier" of countries in the Middle East to the ring of nations joined in NATO extending to the Atlantic. That interest was further developed when Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan joined Great Britain in the Baghdad Pact, partly invented by the U.S.A., mainly organized by Britain, detachedly joined by American observers and consultants, and finally shorn down into CENTO in 1959, after the revolution of June 1958 in Iraq and that nation's withdrawal from the Pact. CENTO remains of major importance to America and the West's defenses, since the Soviet knows these frontiers are the trip line.

It is almost every day screamed out from the Cairo Radio that Israel is the "beach-head of western imperialism." The Palestine Mandate and the Balfour Declaration were never, surely, instituted with a beach-head in mind, nor was the state of Israel instaurated by the United Nations resolution of 1947 for that purpose. Nor was the state recognized by so many nations, including the Soviet Union, because it possessed this character. But the Arab nations have, perhaps, brought this fate on themselves, by the pursuit of not only a selfish policy, vis-a-vis America, Britain, and France, but for their very deep involvements with the Soviet Union since the fall of 1955. It cannot be a happy affair for Israel, democratic and social and economically aspiring, to be regarded as a bridge-head by Arab nations who hate her very existence; but she may be forced into it. Indeed, it has, through Arab insistence and some misdeeds, become an interest of America and her Allies to hope, that in the event of war or a close approach to it, they might be able to prevail on Israel to permit deployment in her territory and passage over her air-space, say, as happened in the crisis of Lebanon and Iraq in June 1958, to assist another Arab nation, Jordan, then under present and immediate threat from Nasser's Egypt.

The nations of the Middle East have declared for "positive neutrality," that is no steady alignment with either Russia or America or, indeed,

any other nation involved in the "cold war," while at the same time benefiting from transactions with them in economic investment and educational, scientific, and technological aid. However, the involvement of Egypt and Syria (later, the United Arab Republic) with the Soviet Union became intimate indeed from the fall of 1955 onwards. It was then that Moscow and Prague leaped across the Mediterranean, a leap Moscow had wanted to make over the centuries, by the provision of arms to Nasser. It was an event that revolutionized the international position and potentialities for mischief of the Middle East. Inept to prevent the new amity, the United States pretended it could prevent deterioration by not giving or selling arms to Israel on the plea that it would not encourage an arms race. How foolish, once the race had been started by the other side! The consequences followed as naturally as the night the day: a swollen-headed military dictator was now in possession of arms. Here was the opportunity for revenging and revising the Egyptian defeat by the Israelis in their War of Liberation in 1948! America's on-again-off-again relations with Nasser led to the refusal of support of the Aswan Dam project, to Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal, to his provocations of Israel by continuous invasions by armed commandos, and then to the Israeli assault in October 1956 followed by that of Britain and France.

The area is full of dynamite. Why was it that the Soviet government moved into Egyptian armed amity in the fall of 1955? Is there any special significance in that date? It is my belief that about that time the new ruling clique in Moscow knew the long-range intermediate missile was possible, already demonstrated, and that the intercontinental one was about to be successful, and with H-bomb warheads. They now needed to ward off attack from such weapons as this which must sooner or later come into the possession of their enemies. Nasser helped them.

There is one other aspect of Middle Eastern geopolitics, besides that of missile bases. We have mentioned it in passing: the Suez Canal. Its importance has been tied up in recent controversies with the transport of oil from Middle East oil fields to the West. But the Canal was not originally built for this, and it is much more the place through which all sorts of goods and passengers are transported. To steam all the way round Africa to and from the Far East or the Indian Ocean is a cruel extortion of ships, crew-time, and fuel. Something more will be suggested on

this problem as we turn to Middle Eastern oil.

The chief resource of the Middle East is oil, and it is so, because, while to the Persians and Turks and Arabs the deposits were in the year 1900 merely one other kind of mud, the British, then the Dutch, and then the Americans applied Western science and technology to its conversion into fuel and energy. The industrial nations, chiefly in the West, have come to rely on oil as the major motive power in their manufactures, agriculture, and pleasure, especially since the perfection of internal combustion engines.

Oil is a strength and a weakness of the Middle East nations. It is a strength since a very large percentage of the nation's income and of the public budget is obtained from the revenues paid to the governments by the investing corporations. Egypt, not having oil, does not share in this, and is covetous of such revenues and control over them. This is one factor in Nasser's preaching of Pan-Arabism; and it is one factor in the refusal of political union by Iraq and Saudi Arabia and in the caution shown by Yemen in its peculiar association with the United Arab Republic. One weakness comes from the fact that Iraq and Saudi Arabia can sell their oil only if they have access to the Mediterranean, via pipelines in Syria (a toll must be paid!) or through the Suez Canal. They are thereby beholden to their neighbors, Syria and Egypt.

There is a major oil weakness, however, destined some day to become pronounced; it is the obverse of their strength. Let us look at this in strategic and economic terms first. The economic life of Western Europe and North America depends on oil. The dependence is peculiarly important as far as the former is concerned because Western Europe has almost no native oil resources: 80 percent of its petroleum needs are met by the Middle East. The standard of living has come to depend on supplies of oil at the costs that have come to be established, always with a larger proportion, now at least 50-50, of the receipts to the Middle East nations. The population, as well as hopes for higher living standards, are rising fast, with the result that the demand for oil in the next two decades must go up sharply. The advent of nuclear power is not expected to offset this by anything substantial in that time. Hence, the Middle East producers have a kind of stranglehold over the West and the U.S.A. They can compel the western nations to make many political concessions rather than have the supplies interrupted. Nasser used the stranglehold successfully in the Suez crisis of

1956-1957, securing a diplomatic triumph by its deployment to wipe out a military disgrace.

As for the U.S.A., the testimony of many Congressional investigations is clear: as the known reserves of the U.S.A. are but 37 billion barrels, and the U.S.A. produces eight billion barrels a year, reliance on home resources would mean complete depletion in a very short time. Policy must follow what might happen in time of war: home supplies in the ground are more defensible than Middle East supplies across the seas. Hence, in peacetime it is as well to use foreign reserves, which are truly tremendous, at least 174 billion barrels, with an annual production of about 4.5 billion barrels.

This is the point of American dependence on the Middle East supplies, not so much the billion or billion-and-a-half-dollar investment. America could lose that investment with hardly a blink of the eyes, her gross national product per year being about 500 billion. But she could not with equanimity lose *access to the supplies*. The theme of wartime policy applies even more strongly to her Allies—assuming that some future wars will be old-fashioned non-nuclear wars, or limited wars as they have come to be called.

The West, indeed the rest of the world, excepting Russia, has a certain dependence on the Middle East for the driving force of its industrial civilization. This is why for the countries in the world poorer than the U.S.A. the Suez Canal has a special importance. If closed, the movement of oil from the Middle East oil fields via the Cape of Good Hope puts a prohibitive cost on crew-time, the number of ships required to deliver the same volume (about three times as many ships), and the consumption of fuel in the ships. Every nickel counts. This was Nasser's special strength when he seized the Canal; it is his strength today.

What is the Soviet interest in the Middle East oil fields? It is not to acquire them or their products for itself, but to inhibit their use by other nations, especially "peaceful" competitors in the West. Her own oil supplies are second only to Middle Eastern reserves. She has the same mentality in this matter as Nasser has expressed in his tract on Egypt's revolution: stoppage of oil would cause the factories to rust, the ships to stand still, the airplanes to fall!

However, time does not stand still: a threat seen is a threat circumvented. Ways are being found of bringing Iranian oil via Turkey; of building bigger tankers; a pipeline goes from Elath in Israel to the Mediterranean, supplied by

Persian wells, to the chagrin of Nasser, Kassem, and Saudi Arabia, but supplied nevertheless. Furthermore, oil supplies in Venezuela, in Libya, and in the Sahara, constitute a major threat to the Middle East's monopoly, both as to source of supply, rendering obsolete the Suez access, and above all so greatly increasing supply as to reduce the price of Middle East oil. Nor is that all. The Soviet Union's oil supplies have so sharply increased that Russia has become a competitive seller to the world market. Indeed, in August, 1960, this competition had become so serious that the Western oil companies operating in the Middle East were forced to decrease their prices correspondingly. This raised an anguished outcry from the Arab League Oil Minister, who argued that the "opponents of the Soviets" should pay the difference—some 6 percent of expected revenues—as the Russian sales were "political" rather than commercial!

Yet there will still be international tension centering on Middle East oil supplies for many years to come. In other words, the United States will still be tempted to (a) conciliate Middle East political demands not purely on a basis of justice but on a basis of access to oil; (b) to subsidize Middle East nations by substantial grants of money for investment and development and maintaining the national budget (e.g. Jordan's to the extent of one-half the total year after year); (c) evade a firm and definite guarantee of Israel for fear of antagonizing the Arabs; and (d) to pussyfoot on the Palestinian refugees, so that that problem persists as a festering sore.

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The forces we have spoken of in the Middle East are still in being and still in the most active ferment. A precarious balance of power among regimes on unstable bases yet active in mischief is in momentary effect. The West needs to affirm the international duties of these regimes at least as firmly as they assert rights. Their people and rulers have just as much to lose in a Communist victory as the West.

Kindness is not misplaced, if it is accompanied by firmness about one's own rights to a guarantee of peaceful life, and the assertion of one's own principles. American policy has been stronger in the first part of a nation's duty and excessively weak in the second, and so leaves herself open to the instability and volatility of military dictators, with the consequences for either retreat in the Middle East or war in consequence of belated action.

Geography of the Middle East¹

Douglas D. Crary

TWO IMPORTANT questions ought to be answered before we discuss the geography of the Middle East. One is "What is geography?" and the other is "What is the Middle East?" In regard to the first question, an answer of sorts could ultimately be achieved. Let it suffice that we are concerned with the distributions and interrelationships of physical and cultural phenomena and their regional associations. But in regard to the second question, there can never be a satisfactory answer. In the first place, the term, "Middle East," is obsolete; and in the second place there is wide disagreement as to the area many people think of when and if they use it. The term, "Near East," is hardly more appropriate. Both terms reflect the egocentricity of Europe, and are, therefore, not properly applicable. In such terms the area is regarded as a region only from the outside. We will concede to popular custom, however, and use the term, "Middle East," here arbitrarily regarded as extending from Egypt to Afghanistan and from Turkey to Aden.

The Middle East as defined is an area of considerable diversity. There are few physical or cultural characteristics common to the area here indicated, except perhaps the agricultural way of life and possibly certain aspects of Islam. The only geographical factors that hold the area together from a regional point of view are its location and the fact that the countries concerned have proximity to each other. It is an entity only in terms of the fact that it is the junction area of three continents; and even the concept of the continents involved as isogenic divisions of the Eur-Afro-Asiatic land mass is a popular and traditional cultural device, rather than a physical fact.

The location of the Middle East at the crossroads of three so-called continents has fostered

diversity rather than unity. The convergence of major surface routes from all directions has brought outside influences to bear upon the area, resulting in a bewildering cultural complex. Today it lies between the conflicting pressures of East and West, each attempting to deny to the other and gain for itself the allegiance of the countries of the Middle East, together with the strategic and economic advantages they command. In this sense, the term, "Middle," is perhaps the most appropriate after all, the Middle East being that part of the "East" caught between these opposing external forces. The fact that the Middle East contains three-quarters of the world's proved oil resources, upon which the free world has become overwhelmingly dependent, has not lessened the significance of its being in the middle.

Within the physical framework of the Middle East are a number of significant differences, most frequently a result of the changing relationship between surface configuration, climate, and vegetation. Of these, climate is unquestionably the most important, as it plays a major part in the shaping of the land surface and the development of soils, and is the basis for the pattern of vegetation. Human societies in general adapt themselves to a particular combination of these physical conditions, the degree of adaptation being in proportion to the approach to the extreme.

In addition to the more direct environmental-human relationship there is the cultural diversity derived from racial mixture, linguistic assimilation, cultural interchange, different degrees of economic development, and separate conditionings by the heritages of different groups of people. The Middle East thus becomes a mosaic of geographical entities, varying in size and character, but together forming a sort of patch-work design. The design becomes cohesive in the conformity of the direction of change of certain physical features. With such a wide range of

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¹ Portions of this paper have been taken from Douglas D. Crary, "Middle East Geography: A Look at the Area's Resources," in Harvey P. Hall, editor, *Middle East Resources: Problems and Prospects* (Washington, D.C., The Middle East Institute, 1954), p. 9-18.

combinations of conditions in the Middle East, generalization for the area as a whole at once becomes misleading and difficult, and serves to emphasize the need for adequate and sufficiently detailed knowledge of its many parts if true understanding of the area is to be achieved.

The major lineaments of surface features in the Middle East consist of a northern highland zone and a broad plateau comprising the rest of the area. The high mountain ranges of the north are parts of the Old World alpine system extending from southern Europe across Asia. These ranges, or bordering mountains of the highland zone, encompass interior basins, as Anatolia and the so-called Persian plateau, a few other high basins of small size, some dissected plateau surfaces, and some low mountains. The rest of the Middle East consists of a portion of the uplifted African-Arabian plateau, which, however, has some surface inconsistencies. These include the great riverine oases of the Middle East, the low mountain ranges bordering the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea and both sides of the Red Sea, and the Red Sea depression itself. The northern highland zone and the African-Arabian plateau may each be subdivided in terms of surface character and composition to an almost infinite degree, depending upon the amount of detail required.

The climatic and vegetation patterns of the Middle East depend to considerable extent upon the distribution of the major surface features, prevailing wind direction, and distance from the windward seas. The combined patterns consequently show marked contrasts, not only in the Middle East as a whole, but also in close proximity. In confined mountain areas, for example, the climate on one side of a mountain range may be quite different from the climate on the other side. The broad view shows a general transition from the colder, wetter, forested areas of the northwest and north through the semi-arid regions of winter rainfall and steppe to the deep, hot desert of the southeast.

Rainfall in the Middle East is heaviest along the windward slopes of the Pontic and Elburz Mountains overlooking the Black and Caspian Seas respectively, with amounts in excess of 60 inches annually and a winter maximum. Here are luxuriant although limited stands of mixed coniferous and broadleaf forests of economic value. Populations are relatively dense, and humid agriculture takes place the year round. Along the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts and at higher altitudes in the Taurus and Zagros

Mountains the summer dry season becomes more pronounced, and the forest changes to a thin, dry, scrub-oak type of little value except for firewood and thatch. Summer irrigation augments winter rainfall to make year round agriculture possible. Population densities per cultivated area are still relatively high. Temperatures along the coasts having the Mediterranean type of climate are fairly mild in both summer and winter.

Away from the windward coasts the total annual rainfall decreases rapidly to 20 inches or less and the length of the summer dry season increases markedly. Temperature ranges become greater. In the interior basins of the northern highlands the temperatures may be very high in the summer and below freezing in the winter. At higher altitudes, low temperature combined with winter precipitation produce heavy accumulations of snow. The vegetation is semiarid steppe, the typical transition between wet and dry climates. Grazing and dry farming of a single crop of grain or an introduced commercial crop support modest population densities.

Continuing toward the southeast the annual rainfall decreases much further to a point where only a few unreliable inches occur during a brief winter period. This is the true desert, a vast expanse of moisture deficiency. Temperatures on the whole are higher in both summer and winter than in the steppes, although great temperature variations are found. Vegetation becomes completely xerophytic, is occasionally only temporary, yet occurs often enough and in sufficient amount to form the basis of an extensive animal economy capable of supporting a few people. The lee coasts, as in the Persian Gulf and along the Arabian and Red Seas, are dry and hot, and consequently sparsely inhabited. On the other hand, where water and good soil are found together, as in the great riverine oases and around certain springs and wells, the limited land is intensively utilized, and densities of population are often enormous. It is quite possible that rural densities in some of the Arabian oases may be among the world's highest, exceeding those of the Yangtze delta or the Nile Valley.

This brief outline of the varying character of surface, climatic, and vegetation patterns, with a limited indication of human response to their several combinations, may be sufficient to give some idea of the basic geographical quality of the Middle East. In terms of area, that portion of the Middle East most favorable to human occupancy is small indeed. By sheer mass the desert

tends to overshadow the importance of the areas geographically suited to human livelihood. Where the habitat is conducive to man's occupancy, he will flourish. But where the environment consists of a combination of physical circumstances adverse to man's occupancy, the more closely he is bound to it. Any improvement in this relationship brought about by so-called development projects usually assumes exaggerated proportions.

Because of its relative scarcity, water occupies a particularly important position in the geographic framework of the Middle East. Peoples in humid climates, where it occurs abundantly, tend to take it for granted. But when water is in short supply, man becomes increasingly conscious of his dependence upon it, and it becomes truly the Gift of Allah. Unfortunately, water is not available everywhere nor at all times in the Middle East, and many human adjustments have to be made to meet the conditions of its quantity and distribution. Where there is sufficient water, as along the rainy northern coasts, it is not by itself a major issue. But as it decreases in amount toward the southeast as the desert becomes increasingly dominant, the less it can be taken for granted.

Water may be considered according to the mode of its occurrence. In the first place is surface water, which includes the great rivers that rise in humid areas and flow across the desert to the sea, the perennial streams in the northern highlands, intermittent streams in the desert, and certain lakes and marshes. In the second place is ground water, which, when it occurs close enough to the surface, is evident in springs or wells.

Water, whether on the surface or in the ground, may also be considered in terms of the relationship between over-all amount and availability to man, either naturally or technologically. In this sense it is water supply, and has greater economic than physical significance. Agriculture is the dominant occupation of man in the Middle East, and over much of the area is possible only by means of irrigation. Even though irrigation is an economic activity, it depends upon a natural resource. Water thus becomes the major link between man's activity and his physical environment. The coincidence of available water and human settlement in the Middle East is so close that the map of one is also the map of the other.

In regions where water is at a premium it is

natural for governments and peoples to strive to increase its availability, which is a good thing and contributes greatly to the improvement of the public welfare. In respect to the rivers of the Middle East, most attention is given to the relationship between flood, low water, and the agricultural cycle.

The improvement of this relationship calls for "development," a process consisting of flood control works, storage dams, irrigation barrages, land reclamation, administrative requirements, flood control policy, an enormous store of hydrologic, geologic, and weather data, pollution control, hydroelectric power, and—finances. All these and many more economic, social, and political matters become involved in seeking to achieve a more equitable annual distribution of irrigation water, the reasons for which could again start off a long list of items. The consequences of such development set in motion a chain reaction. Cause-effect-cause relationships begin to multiply, more and more aspects of the physical and cultural scene come to bear upon the development program, economies and ways of life are affected, populations increase (or explode), new demands are created, soils become depleted, roads must be built, people must be educated, health programs initiated, birth rates controlled—all of which means that considerable knowledge of the land and its people should be well in mind before such a program is undertaken, and that the proper application of this knowledge is indispensable to economic development.

It is evident that the pattern of settlement in the Middle East is determined in large part by the availability of water, the distribution of which, as has been indicated, is most uneven. Fixed settlement showing fairly broad patterns occurs only where sufficient rainfall permits agriculture, as in Antolia, Armenia, northwest Iran, and in a few highland sections of the Zagros. But even in these areas the average density of population is considerably less than the number of people per square mile of cultivable land. Otherwise, where irrigation is necessary, population patterns tend to be spotty, owing to the limiting nature of the irrigation process itself. Hence irrigation, particularly in terms of method and extension, plays a dominant role in man's occupancy of the land, within the limits of the water supply.

The people of the Middle East may be divided into three general groups on the basis of the relationship between ways of life and the factors

of history and geography. These divisions are the farmers, comprising approximately 80 percent of the total population of the Middle East as defined; the nomads, comprising perhaps less than 5 percent; and the essentially urban dwellers of all kinds, constituting the remaining roughly 15 percent. This division cuts across ethnic and political lines, making any distinctions between these three groups on a cultural or national basis wholly superficial and probably wrong. People living under conditions conducive to agriculture are so engaged, and those occupying areas capable of supporting only a meager livestock economy must move with their animals in search of pasture or starve. In addition to the basic adaptations to habitat, each of these groups is more or less dependent on the others. The interdependence of the farmer and the nomad, economically, is greater than is ordinarily realized. The farmers raise the crops, the nomads furnish beasts of burden, meat, and wool; each group utilizes the products of the other. Urban dwellers supply goods and services to both farmer and nomad in exchange for their products.

Agriculture is overwhelmingly the dominant occupation of man in the Middle East. It has been a way of life since ancient times: the excuse, almost, for his existence. Despite the great diversity of agricultural systems, crop combinations, and farm practices, a consequence of varied geographical conditions, the attitude of the agricultural population toward the cultivation of land remains remarkably uniform. Peasants everywhere, whether Persians or Egyptians, Turks or Arabs, share a common agricultural tradition which penetrates in one way or another into almost every aspect of Middle Eastern life. Religion as practiced in the villages is concerned with the passage of the seasons, the growth process of crops, and the good or bad fortune which Allah dictates. Even the peasant's strictly nonagricultural activities, as marriage (hence childbirth), are timed according to agricultural activity.

Agricultural productivity clearly depends upon combinations of physical conditions. It likewise depends upon people. It is an expression of the relationship between the nature of the land and man's ability to use it. Various devices and careful planning can, within limits, improve the usability of land. Over much of the Middle East the land is of low productivity, the agricultural output per person is low, and farm incomes are low. Most Middle Eastern peasants,

existing at a very low subsistence level, do not have the opportunity for accumulating capital. Consequently, as occupied land cannot be improved or even maintained, yields decrease, the demand for labor increases, the pressure of population on the land increases, and the standard of living declines even further. This is what has happened in Egypt, and why the new High Aswan Dam is so important to the Egyptians, even as a temporary stop-gap measure. As has been said, "It is never a land which is overpopulated in terms of inhabitants per square mile; it is always an economy, in terms of inhabitants per square meal."²

In contrast to the sedentary agriculturists, the true nomads have no fixed points of attachment to the land. The closest they come to belonging to an area is the tribal domain within which they carry on their periodic movements. The nomads defend their grazing areas and their right to move about in it with the same intensity that the peasants regard their cultivated fields. This is necessary for their survival, as it takes a large area to support even a few people.

The nomads depend on mobility. To move freely and quickly requires a high degree of cooperation and efficiency, and a considerable amount of political independence. The tribal system, under a sheikh or patriarch, survives among the nomads as the best organizational means whereby their way of life may continue. But the encroachments of westernization and the growing consciousness of national frontiers have reduced their significance. The increased use of the motor vehicle has cut into their transport business, the desert caravan formerly being a monopoly of the nomads. Market centers have replaced the need for raiding during hard times. Although still an important economic group in the Middle East, according to an anthropologist friend of mine, "Nomads, like cowboys, are more glamorous than numerous."

The third principal group of people in the Middle East are the urbanites. There are two main classes, the aristocracy and an approximation of so-called middle class. The former includes high officials of both the traditional and western ways of life, wealthy merchants and business men, members of distinguished families, etc. Most of the landlords are found in this group, persons who have inherited their title to

² Earl Parker Hanson. "Hunger or Plenty for the Future?" *The American Scholar*. 22:474; Autumn 1953.

lands and who derive much of their income from rentals paid by the dependent peasants. This upper-class group has traditionally controlled the public life.

The middle-class urbanites include the artisans and merchants of ancient standing, and a new, prosperous, forward looking citizenry. The craftsmen and merchants are held together by one of the Middle East's most venerable institutions, the bazaar. But with the development of international trade the large-scale importation of mass-produced European goods has had an exceedingly damaging effect on the craftsmen, and many of them have been forced to turn their efforts to newly established industries. The new citizenry is composed of public servants, members of the independent professions, white-collar workers, etc. This group has provided much of the incentive and leadership of the new nationalisms in the Middle East.

Industrialization, like agriculture, depends upon both physical and cultural conditions, specifically raw materials, power, labor, capital, and customers. These exist in the Middle East in widely varying degree, the sum of which does not point toward a great industrial future for the area, at least in the Western sense. Except for the traditional handicrafts, which are suffering from competition with imported goods, and a number of small industries manufacturing consumers' goods from locally produced raw materials, there are few major or basic industries. Power from potential hydroelectric sources and petroleum seems in good supply, and could eventually be applied to certain aspects of heavy industry subject to the development of new techniques. Labor is present, and has already shown its capacity to acquire western-type technical skills. Government capital, as in Turkey and to some extent elsewhere, has subsidized industry, but it is too often politically influenced. Private capital has traditionally turned to the land, and foreign capital has hesitated to take the risks involved in an uncertain, nonindustrial atmosphere.

The last factor prerequisite to industrial development is customers. Eighty-five percent of the Middle East population multiplied by nearly zero does not constitute much of a market. It is a paradox of the nature of things that industrialization in the Middle East would help offset rural poverty, but rural poverty itself is one of the main obstacles in the way of industrialization. By and large, industrialization is facing the handicaps of limited raw materials and political and

social patterns poorly adapted to the requirements of industrial economics.

So much has been said and written about the Middle East petroleum industry that only two brief observations need be made here. In the first place, the political, economic, and strategic implications of the world's largest petroleum reserve so completely overshadow other mineral resources that it is easy to forget that they exist. Coal, iron, copper, chrome, manganese, phosphates, and some others are present, but in limited quantities and in widely scattered deposits. Because of their nature and combination under present methods of exploitation they are of limited economic value, and await new techniques and demands which would make their exploitation economically and socially feasible.

Secondly, the Middle East economy has been profoundly affected by the petroleum industry through revenues provided to the participating countries, and through the increased use of the product in the region as a whole. Royalties and taxes are being used to finance large-scale internal improvements of all kinds, such as irrigation and flood control projects, improved transportation facilities, and public education and welfare. The product oil has made possible more vehicles, more domestic lighting and heating, more power for small factories, diesel and gasoline-operated irrigation pumps, more and more primus stoves. It is interesting to note that these contributions, both indirect and direct, have much to do with the agricultural process and thus to the improvement of the standard of living of the ordinary man.

We have examined the essential features of the geography of the Middle East with varying degrees of emphasis depending upon what is necessary for a general understanding of the area. We have seen that the Middle East, by virtue of its location, is of particular strategic and commercial significance as the "crossroads" of the continents. By the same token the Middle East, in spite of its considerable size, is peculiarly vulnerable to conquest, and is thus of primary importance in world power politics. We have seen that its bordering mountains and exposures to the seas account for the patterns of population and land use, a horseshoe of habitability tossed by the prevailing westerlies upon steppes and tropical deserts, when the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates Rivers have nurtured civilization, and where water is the key to life and oil the prize. We have

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The Rise and Progress of Middle Eastern Nationalism

C. Ernest Dawn

AMONG Easterners, as among Westerners, the term "nationalism" has long been used in two ways: to refer to a process of state-building whereby new political units, based on the nation, are formed by the union of smaller units or by the breakup of larger ones; and to describe the surging tide of anti-foreign sentiment and activity. If the latter use has now gained wide currency through press headlines, it is also—as we shall see—the one which first engaged the attention of political groups of the Middle East. Once, however, the idea of the nation as a weapon against the foreigner had been introduced, the Middle Easterners then began to dispute among themselves the further means and applications of the concept, including that of state-building. Yet to this day "nationalism" remains inseparably connected with the struggle against the alien invader.

Prior to the eighteenth century there was no Western intruder in the Middle East—hence no "Western problem." For the same reason, there was little to shake the self-confidence of the inhabitants who, as Moslems, had submitted themselves to the law which the one true God had revealed through His one true messenger Mohammed. Nor, at that time, was there cause for perturbation at the view, when glimpsed, of infidel Europe. The westernmost section—Egypt, the Arab territories, and Turkey—for centuries had been independent, first under the Mameluks and the Ottomans, then, after 1517, united within the Ottoman Empire. These territories had more than held their own in their many and varied contacts with Europe. Europeans in the

Middle East lived there at native sufferance and on their terms, under capitulations freely granted by the local authorities. In military matters, the Ottomans in 1357 began a series of victories which extended over two centuries with scarcely an interruption.

A division, indeed, a major ideological split, did occur in the sixteenth century and produced a conflict which, by the time of its conclusion (in 1638), had separated the Middle East into two regions. The Perso-Turkish conflict was fought between rival forms of Islam, the Twelve Shi'ism of the Persians and the Sunnism of the Ottoman Empire. What religion had sundered, geography kept apart, and the easternmost section, Persia, was insulated from the rest of the area by its mountains and deserts, as it was bounded from Europe by the Mameluk and Ottoman realms. Even then, after the end of overt hostilities, the distinction between the two regions remained intact. This analysis of nationalism will therefore be confined to developments within the predominantly Moslem territories of the Ottoman Empire.

In the immediately succeeding centuries, the grounds for Moslem satisfaction were rudely shaken by a succession of unmitigated disasters for the Ottoman Empire. War after war saw the armies of the faithful suffering defeats at the hands of the Christian Europeans, primarily the Russians. The occasional victory, military or diplomatic, was more the result of European than Ottoman initiative. Worse still, this triumphant flexing of European power shattered the internal order. The despised Christian communities rose, gained partial autonomy and, ultimately, won their independence. Christian traders and promoters demanded and obtained rights which far exceeded those granted earlier in the capitulations, and Western missionaries came in to convert the faithful with open charges that Mohammed was an imposter. What was to be done? From the outset, some Ottomans saw that to confront the West they must imitate

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the West. Not unnaturally, sultans, military commanders, and high officials sought the improvement of Ottoman military and administrative organizations by borrowing from abroad. Ottomans were trained in the new science. So began the establishment of state schools and the exchange of intellectuals, instructors from Europe and students to Europe, which has continued until the present day.

But the situation remained intolerable: unthinkable that Islam and Ottoman culture could be considered inferior to Christianity and European culture! Besides, only partial success attended the assimilationist efforts. At first, reaction was wholly conservative in mood. This was expressed, on the popular level, in the form of anti-Christian and anti-foreign riots; among the intellectuals, in the form of a revival of traditional apologetics. Beginning in the 1860's, a continuous stream of books and periodicals argued that Islam and Ottoman civilizations were equal if not, indeed, superior to the Western ethos.

This defense of the "Ottoman conservatives," with its emphasis on approval of and loyalty to the existing state of affairs, was regarded as less than adequate by a small group of intellectuals who came to call themselves the "New Ottomans." In their opposition philosophy, the central tenet was also a strong Empire, but its proponents, generally speaking, had more intimate contacts with the neighboring West and they were quick to admit the deplorable contrast. This gap, as they saw it, was not only in military and political affairs, but extended to science and economic management. Yet true Islam, they maintained, was not irreconcilable with progress and development. Religion had been corrupted and the remedy, therefore, lay in restoring Islam to its former purity while concurrently welcoming an infusion of the necessary elements of modernity. No doubt, the New Ottomans or modernists had been impressed with Europe. In particular, they were struck with the mass or popular origins of the revolutions that swept Europe from the end of the eighteenth century on. The source of French greatness, for instance, they ascribed to the patriotism of the French people. Similarly, the modernists claimed, when the Ottomans became imbued with the love of the fatherland the resulting motive force would expand the Empire and Islam to its proper heroic dimensions.

Ottomanism, whether conservative or modern-

ist, dominated the Empire until 1914. The New Ottomans joined forces with a small group of Turkish magnates in 1876 in a palace revolution which deposed the sultan and established a constitution, and were in turn suppressed by the new sultan, the once infamous 'Abdal-Hamid II, who soon suspended the constitution. The movement continued, secretly in Turkey, openly in Europe with expatriate aid in the form of the Committee of Union and Progress, now the "Young Turks." After 1908, when the Empire was dominated by the Committee, the ideology of Ottoman-modernism triumphed.

Ottoman modernism did not save the Empire. The Christian nationalities of Europe and Anatolia continued to clamor for self-government, and their aspirations were supported by the European powers. Furthermore, the new ideology was challenged by parallel and therefore rival growths among the Moslem populations of the Empire.

In its formative period, the nationalist movement in Egypt was Ottomanist and Islamic. Here too, initially, the problem was conceived as a defense of Islam, considerably exacerbated by growing British encroachments. Complete independence from the sultan in Constantinople, since autonomy was assured (and granted legal sanction by the achievements of Muhammed 'Ali), seemed at first as undesirable as it was unnecessary. But soon an internal conflict arose which was to give Egyptian nationalism a character all its own. Although the vast majority of the population, including the wealthy landlords and merchants, spoke Arabic, the hereditary governor-general, the top officials, and the higher ranks of the military were non-Egyptian, usually Turks or Circassians, who spoke Turkish. A native Egyptian, whatever his economic or social status, could not rise to the highest position. Egyptian intellectuals had by then also looked abroad and, no less attracted by what they saw than their Ottoman counterparts, began, by mid-century, to refer to an Egyptian fatherland and nation. The large strides being made in Egyptology also helped to accelerate this separatist consciousness. Thus, the slogan "Egypt for the Egyptians," came to be directed against the so-called "Turks" in Egypt as well as against the Europeans.

In the end the concept of an Egyptian nation came to dominate political thought in Egypt. After a brief quiescence, political agitation, now concentrated against the British, revived under

the leadership of Mustafa Kamil (who is not to be confused with the Turkish leader, Mustafa Kemal). The Egyptians, however, as Moslems, continued to acknowledge the spiritual leadership of the Ottoman sultan in his capacity as caliph of all the Moslems.

Lebanon and Syria also were dominated by Ottomanism, both conservative and modernist, down to World War I. Syrian Arabs had come into close contact with the West, most importantly as a result of the schools founded by American and French missionaries. Among these graduates, Ottoman modernism found ready adherents. The Egyptian nationalist precursor, Muhammad 'Abduh, had propounded a theory that proved congenial to the Syrian temperament. He pointed out that since primitive Islam was Arab, the first condition of an Islamic restoration must be the revival of Arab culture. The historical logic of this appealed notably to the Syrians, Muhammad Rashid Rida and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, who extended the thesis to confirm the pre-eminence of the Arabs among Moslems. The realization of Arab national rights would herald the general rebirth. These ideas struck sparks in both Syria and Iraq, and by 1914 there were ardent groups advocating Arab political rights.

The point so far elaborated has been that Middle Eastern nationalism grew out of an emotional reaction to the overwhelming power and progress of Europe in the modern world with its implicit imputation of inferiority to the East. In this sense, it is not even anti-colonialism, and in its conservative and Ottomanist forms it was fully developed before any European power occupied any Moslem territory in the Ottoman Empire. Even Arabism was developed before any European power had occupied a country which the Arab nationalists regarded as Arab. The conservatives denied Western superiority, the modernists admitted it but explained it away, and all resented it. Those who dismiss the nationalist reaction as an aspect of religious fanaticism, the product of a bigotry which inheres in Islam but which is fortunately lacking in other religions, are wide of the mark. The Middle Eastern nationalists were defending not so much a religion as a way of life and a sense of personal honor as well. Religion, although important, was expendable; the way of life and the people's pride were not. This is apparent, I think, in two developments: first, the emergence of a purely secular Turkish nationalism; and,

second, modifications in the theory of Arabism.

The Turkish Ottomanists had never been consistent in their actions. Talking Ottomanism, they practiced Turkism. Furthermore, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, some Turks began to be interested in the Turkish language, Turkish history, and Turkish culture as distinct from Moslem and Ottoman. By 1913, some theorists, notably Ziya Gökalp, had developed a theory of Turkish nationalism which eventually achieved concretion in the Turkish Republic under its founder Mustafa Kemal.

In the new Turkism, primitive, pristine Islam and its superiority to other ways of life, disappeared. The new Turks distinguished between "culture," "civilization," and "religion," but "culture" was essential. It embodied the vital spirit of a people, and, ultimately, of a modern nation. As the Ottoman modernists had attributed the former superiority of the Moslems to pure Islam, and their subsequent decline to its corruption, so Gökalp found "the factors responsible for" Ottoman greatness in the "folk civilization"; for Ottoman decline, in its submergence in Islam and in Middle Eastern civilization. "We have to create a new civilization in our own spirit," he wrote when he had still not distinguished Turk from Ottoman. "This national Ottoman civilization will arouse the envy of European civilization . . . [which] is based on rotten and decaying foundations and is doomed to ruin." In complete harmony with this theory, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk erected into state dogma linguistic and historical theories which made the Turks the originators of all civilization. In the last two decades, however, these extremes of romantic nationalism have been greatly moderated. Obviously, the feeling that Turkish culture is European and that Turkey's future lies in European integration is now widespread.

Arab political theory has not as yet expelled Islam from Arabism or even formally subordinated it. Yet here, too, one witnesses the primacy of cultural or ethnic identification over religious. Consider the reaction of Christian Arabs, who had joined their Moslem Turkish and Arab brethren in denying that the East was inferior to Europe. Already, by 1914, some Christian Arabs, like Nadrah Matran had implicitly accepted the theory that Islam was an essential part of Arabism because Islam brought greatness to the Arabs. By 1930, the theory was explicitly stated by Christian Arab nationalists

that Islam was the moving force in "the first great Arab conquest, with which was founded the modern glory of the Arabs. . . ." Even in Christian dominated Lebanon, Arabism, although of a restricted kind, has edged out the home-spun "Phoenicianism" once so dear to Maronite hearts. Since 1943, Lebanon is to be independent, not a part of an Arab union, but it is to have an "Arab face."

Also pertinent to this search for cultural roots—again of the Turkish pattern—is the recall of the pre-Islamic achievements of the Arab nation. The so-called "wave theory" of Semitic origins was adopted; Arabia was the original home of the Semites, who moved out through the area in great and civilizing waves. The "Semites" were equated with the "Arabs." So the Babylonian and other civilizations of the pre-Hellenic Orient were claimed as the gift of the Arab nation to humanity, with Islam the crowning glory.

The yearning to leap from humiliation to grandeur has determined the principal external manifestations of Middle Eastern nationalism from the beginning. From the days of the Ottomans to the present sway of the Arab Renaissance Party and 'Abd al-Nasir, nationalists have sought to erase the marks of national humiliation, inevitably the symbols of foreign might. Both conservative and modernist Ottomans stood as one for the defense of the sacred soil, and even for the recovery of every lost square inch. As each section of the Arab world became free of foreign rule, its nationalists have set their eyes on the liberation of other sections, whether the inhabitants of those sections desired liberation or not. In this context, the Arab enmity to Israel is not strange, it is not new, and it is not primarily concerned with the proper or the improper behavior of Israel. Israel is a symbol, the greatest symbol, of Arab abasement. It must be expunged.

Pre-occupation with the symbols of might—and the accompanying concentration on foreign affairs—has profoundly influenced the development of nationalism. Thus far, at least, the goals have been set too high. The enemies of Middle East greatness have simply been too powerful to be overcome by the resources available to Middle East aspirations. Thus, the New Ottomans came in with the great threat of the Bulgarian crisis of 1875-76 and went out with the Turkish defeats of 1877-78; the young Turks rose to power in the renewed external threats after 1902;

Young Turkism was replaced by Arabism and Turkism amid the failures of the Balkan wars and of World War I. The elder statesmen of the Arab world were made heroes by the fight against the British and French, but were in the end discredited by the failure of the war with Israel.

Nationalist frustrations have at least kept open the channels through which flow new ideas from Europe. As one generation of nationalists was routed, its formula were denounced by the second generation who advanced a still braver new philosophy. As the purely military and administrative reforms of Mahmud failed, the legal reforms of the *tanzimat* were proposed, which gave way to constitutionalism. And so it has run with integral nationalism, state capitalism, and state socialism, each having its day, on down to the present, when, among the Arabs, strands drawn from the Hobson-Leninist theory of imperialism and the Western Liberal explanation of Asian "feudalism" as the product of colonialist rule have been woven into the texture.

Another aspect of the preoccupation with foreign affairs has been the continuous involvement in blocs and alliances. Traditionally, the Middle Eastern nationalist—from Sultan Selim III to the current positive neutralists—have had no attachment to any one great power. When Russia, as champion of the Balkan nationalities, was the principal threat to nationalist aims, the Ottomans collaborated with Russia's principal rivals, England and France (but Sultan Mahmud accepted Russian help when the immediate threat was Muhammed 'Ali of Egypt). When Democratic England and France joined Tsarist Russia (harboring common territorial designs), the Ottomans turned to imperial Germany. Kemalist Turkey accepted, in the beginning, Bolshevik Russian help against the British-supported Greeks. So the Arabs in turn looked to Nazi Germany.

After impatiently anticipating aid from the United States, freed from the influence of the pro-Zionist Truman and the intrigues of the British, they took arms from the Soviet Union, the only power which was willing to supply them without restriction as to quantity or as to mode of use. Turkey, on the other hand, managed to avoid involvement in a war which was of no concern to her, and under the new conditions of the post-war world, accepted American assistance in her efforts to resist pressure from the Soviet Union.

What began as a defense of Islam and the Ottoman Empire ended in the partition of the Empire and the proliferation of distinct nationalisms. Why? Surely, if the common enemy were Europe, opposition should breed unity; if field artillery, science, political progress, and the like, induced Middle Eastern humiliation, acquisition of these factors could as clearly regenerate area pride. The failure to achieve the obvious was partly due, as we have seen, to the scarcity of local resources. But, also, given the structure of Middle Eastern society and politics, no group of men in the Middle East has ever held a durable and firm control of the government.

In Sunnite theory, government was monarchical absolutism restricted only by the obligation of the monarch to enforce the law. The Moslem state thus was a personal state from the beginning. Within the general restriction that the ruler must enforce the law and that he could not legislate, all government, whether caliphate or sultanate, was a mere extension of the person of the ruler. He was assisted by soldiers and bureaucrats on the one hand and learned men on the other, but he appointed them and he removed them. Even the succession to the throne was determined by the person of the ruler. There were doctrines and laws of succession, it is true, but buried in the formulas of the jurists concerning succession, even to the caliphate, was the admission that power belonged to whoever could acquire and hold it. For beneath the fiction of Middle Eastern absolutism was the reality that government was a coalition of conflicting interests and groups—regional, sectarian, family, and purely personal.

The basic political process was not radically altered at the appearance of the "Western problem." In the past, it is true, political rivalries had not been given ideological definition or had been defined in terms of sectarian rifts within Islam. Now, the proponents of change were defending Islam and the Empire. Members of the upper classes, at odds with the current holders of office, stated their opposition to the government by attacking the adequacy of the latter's "nationalism." Some of these upperclass opposition leaders were elder statesmen; others were striplings just grabbing the ladder of power. Many were quasi-intellectuals who had some contact with modern thought. Joined to them, by patronage and clientship in many cases, were the pure intellectuals, the clerks and the newer propagandists and journalists, sometimes of middle-

class origin. Such, apparently, were the New Ottomans, and the Young Turks. Such were the Egyptian nationalists of the 1870's. Such decidedly were the Arab nationalists before 1914, and such has been the nature of every new nationalist movement among the Arabs through the years since 1914.

Contact with Europe did, however, make one very important contribution to the political process. This was the increase in the capabilities of the armed forces, the traditional instrument for effecting a change in government. The military technology of the past century and a half greatly expanded the geographic area which could be brought under some degree of control by a central government. As Middle East weapons become progressively more complicated and more expensive, the power available to local notables has declined in relative effectiveness. But—lo and behold!—the army nationalists did not prove very different from their civilian counterparts. In the various officers' revolts, the factor of youth had perhaps an unusual importance, but the similarities are more striking: the transient espousal of new doctrines, the exposure to Europe, and the factional opposition to those in office. Moreover, army coups have been carried out in conjunction with opposition civilian groups. Even when this has not been the case, as in the Za'im coup in Syria, the Egyptian coup of 1952, and the Iraqi coup of 1958, the military party has always made it a practice to form a working coalition with civilian elements after the seizure of power.

All this might seem to mean that the building of larger political units is impossible, and that the Middle East is undergoing progressive disintegration. Yet there has been some progress toward a wider Arab union. The conflicts inherent in Middle Eastern politics can produce larger and more comprehensive units as well as smaller ones, for rivalries breed coalitions and alliances. It would be foolish cynicism, moreover, to deny any sincerity to the various generations of Middle Eastern nationalists, even though each generation has tended to make this charge against its predecessor. In power, each group, regardless of its motivation and method of operation, did make an effort to realize some of its goals. Much of the apparent confusion and many of the outward failures, we may conclude, can be explained by the facts that the goals were too vague and largely beyond attainment by purely national resources.

The Economics of the Middle East

Joachim O. Ronall

WIND-SWEPT DESERTS, slender minarets, camel caravans, dashing sheikhs, veiled beauties and, since World War II, oil drilling rigs: This, to many Americans, is the image of the Middle East created by the habit of thinking in stereotypes. The realities of the region are different. The Middle East is not romantic. It is a harsh area, notable for too much oil and too little water. United Nations reports describe the features of the Middle East as follows:

"A rapidly growing population which in some countries is pressing heavily on the means of subsistence; a low hygienic and educational level which manifests itself in the form of high mortality, widespread disease and low literacy rates; a paucity of known mineral resources with the important exception of oil; a marked concentration on agriculture in which the greater part of the population is engaged and which provides the bulk of the national income; a marked shortage of capital and a consequent dependence on foreign sources for investment, and a lack of technological advancement which, coupled with natural and social causes, leads to a low productivity."

THE MIDDLE EAST IN 1960

Land and People

Country	Area	Population
Afghanistan	250,000	12,000,000
Cyprus	3,500	500,000
Egypt	385,000	24,000,000
Iran	630,000	19,000,000
Iraq	171,000	5,000,000
Israel	8,000	2,000,000
Jordan	38,000	1,500,000
Lebanon	4,000	1,500,000
Libya	680,000	1,000,000
Saudi Arabia	870,000	6,500,000
Sudan	970,000	9,000,000
Syria	74,000	4,000,000
Turkey	296,000	25,000,000
Yemen	75,000	4,500,000

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These are the present conditions of the majority of about 120 million people on the four million square miles of the Middle East, from Iran in the east to Libya in the west, and from Turkey in the north to the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula.

AGRICULTURE

One of the few common features of the Middle East is the basically agricultural fabric of its society. In most countries of the region, agriculture is the major single contributor to the national product. However, the rural population is unevenly distributed. It concentrates along the coasts of the Mediterranean, Black, and Caspian Seas; in the areas of heavy winter rains—northern Iraq, eastern Turkey and northwestern Iran—and in the valleys of the Euphrates, Tigris, and Nile. This distribution leaves large parts of the Middle East uncultivated, and this deficiency has been aggravated by an onerous system of obsolete landownership. Until recently, three quarters of the agricultural population of Egypt owned no land at all or less than one acre; in Syria half of the cultivated land consisted of large estates; and in Lebanon less than 200 people owned about half of all the surveyed land.

With the exception of Egypt, less than half of the arable land in the Middle East is cultivated: 17 percent in Iraq, 40 percent in Syria. In the United States 1.8-3.1 acres of land per capita are required to produce adequate food. Assuming a less productive soil in the Middle East, reducing the available land to three acres per capita and assuming, furthermore, the continuation of the present rate of population growth, there is no reason for concern over the over-all ratio between land and man. The only exception, again, is Egypt, where the population increase outstrips the natural resources to the extent that even the completion of the Aswan High Dam project would only prevent a further decline of the present living level. Other measures, such as occupational and geographical shifts in the population, will have to be taken into serious consideration. Archeological evidence indicates a much denser population in ancient times than today. The Roman Limes of Chalcis, constructed

to protect the settled land against the encroachment of the desert, ran about a hundred miles east of today's dividing line between the desert and the sown. It thus appears that the present low living standards are only in part due to climatic conditions and the lack of natural resources. Much of the Middle East's poverty is man-made, stemming from historical and sociological causes. "Yet the land remains, the rain still falls, the rivers flow. If the water can once more be saved and spread upon the land, crops will grow again," says a United Nations report.

A complicated system of land tenure that began with the Arab conquest in the seventh century together with a traditional disdain of farming has prevented the growth of an efficient agriculture. Today, the importance of a fair system of land tenure has been recognized and most governments have taken steps to prevent both the continuation and accumulation of large estates and the fragmentation of small holdings. In addition, credit facilities, cooperative societies, and technological improvements have been instituted in many countries. However, operational and legislative efforts have so far had but a marginal impact on the agricultural pattern and its economy of the Middle East. Although beginnings have been made to remedy the evils of traditional Middle Eastern land-ownership, the change of economic and social systems, except through revolutions, is a slow process. Western mediaeval feudalism, which was also based on land tenure, created the concepts of social responsibilities and allegiances. These, in turn, were channeled into a venturesome urban population which became the main promoter of development in the West. Lacking these experiences, the Middle East stagnated. In agriculture, the influence of traditional thought and action have been more arresting than anywhere else.

BASIC ELEMENTS: PEOPLE

Rapidly increasing population is another recurrent feature of the Middle East. In Egypt, the population rose from two and a half million in 1800 to 24 million in 1960 and will reach 35 million in 1975. A projection into that year puts the population of the Middle East at almost 200 million instead of the present 125 million. Western countries have been able to cope with their population levels through intensified agriculture, industrialization, and the colonization of sparsely populated areas. This development of the West was not paralleled in the Mid-

dle East. There, the beginnings of economic development, of improved sanitation and modern medicine, have so far only accelerated the growth of the population, at present 2.5 percent per annum, to the extent that only an unprecedented decline would result in population trends comparable to those of the West. Increasing contacts with the West are accompanied by greater urbanization. Ports and trading centers have attracted elements from the rural sector which in time formed an urban proletariat.

URBANIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST
(in thousands)

	1850	1900	1939	1958
Alexandria	142	320	838	925
Baghdad	20	145	300	450
Beirut	15	80	180	250
Cairo	250	570	1,300	2,100
Damascus	50	80	230	303
Istanbul	400	500	795	1,245
Jerusalem	15	35	130	150
Teheran	60	200	550	1,500

Next to the quantity, the quality of the population becomes significant to economic development. First, there is a close relation between literacy and economic advancement, since certain educational minimum standards facilitate the adjustment of the individual to the complexities of a modernizing economy. Two charts indicating the degree of literacy and of economic progress in various countries would be almost identical. The low literacy rate in the Middle East retards economic progress. The non-Moslem element of the population, generally in closer contact with more advanced economic methods, shows a higher degree of literacy. All countries are fighting illiteracy, but the lack of funds and, consequently, of schools and teachers in many countries has prevented the full implementation of comprehensive and ambitious compulsory school legislation.

However, the transplantation of Western educational values into society different from that which produced these values has been one of the reasons for the present tension between the West and the Middle East. No force has been produced there strong enough to resist the expansion of western technology. On the contrary, the Middle East accepted the forms of the West in the belief that the possession of the material manifestations of the West would ensure the solution of Middle Eastern problems. Lacking the historical experience of western growth, the people of the Middle East did not explore the founda-

tions of western technology and its ramifications. The conspicuous achievement of education, the diploma, brought prestige and ensured social advancement and much coveted non-menial employment. But the predominantly agricultural economy of the Middle East does not have sufficient jobs for diploma-holders prejudiced against manual labor. Thus, an intellectual proletariat came into existence developing and proclaiming anti-western feelings and ascribing their plight solely to the oppressive colonialism of the Western Powers.

The second qualitative factor affecting economic development is health. Poor health results in low efficiency and high absenteeism and thus impairs productivity. The Middle East is "particularly rich and interesting in human diseases." The low levels of living and the climate in the region account for a number of diseases specific to the Middle East; in addition, the holy places attract pilgrims from all over the world, and these carry their own diseases into the region. Preventive medicine would, therefore, be especially important to the Middle East. However, as usual in underdeveloped areas, curative medicine is able to mobilize more financial assistance than preventive medicine, since the former's results are much more spectacular.

NATURAL RESOURCES

Except for oil, the Middle East is poor in natural resources. Its share in the world trade bears this out: between 1937 and 1957, Middle Eastern exports remained at the same level of 2.6 percent of the world's total exports, its share in imports rose slightly from 2.6 to 3.0 percent. Few commodities produced in the Middle East—again with the exception of oil—form a substantial part of the world's production. Dates are one significant item. The district around the Shatt Al Arab in southern Iraq produces more than three-quarters of the world's total date crop. When citrus, cotton, and barley are added, the range of Middle Eastern products that contribute in any sizeable proportion to world production is exhausted. Mineral production, apart from oil, in the Middle East is notable only in copper and chrome ore where production, mainly in Cyprus and Turkey, amounts to approximately 20 percent of the world total. A unique source of minerals is the Dead Sea, which belongs to Israel and Jordan. The production of potash and of bromine has been undertaken, so far, only on the Israel side of the Dead Sea. While these resources are likely to reduce in the future the shortage of

fertilizers in many Asian countries, the lack of cheap power has prevented the full exploitation of the Dead Sea, including magnesium. The geological knowledge of the Middle East on the whole is scanty. With the exception of Egypt and Israel, no country has yet been able to arrange for the publication of a detailed geological survey. Spot investigations reveal the existence of many mineral deposits, but specific information is scarce.

BASIC ELEMENTS: OIL

The Middle East produces at present about 250 million tons of oil annually. That is roughly one-quarter of the world total. Middle Eastern oil is the major supplier to the international trade. This position has been reached only since the end of World War II. In six territories of the Middle East—Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain—the production and export of oil dominate all capital invested, labor employed, and income produced. Other countries of the region—Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt—benefit substantially from oil transit. But the oil industry, which started in Iran half a century ago, remained foreign to the countries and to the people of the Middle East foreign in capital, in management, and in use. Only a small portion of the oil produced in the Middle East is used there. While the population in the six producing countries is about 30 million, the entire oil industry there employs about 200,000, or two-thirds of 1 percent of the aggregate population. In Saudi Arabia, the 25,000 local employees of the oil company represent about 0.4 percent of the total population.

But huge revenues from royalties and profit-sharing arrangements accrue to the local governments. Between 1946 and 1959 these direct revenues rose from 55 million to almost one and a half billion dollars annually. Thus government income in 1959 was roughly equal to half of the cumulative investment of the oil industry in the region, estimated in 1958 at \$2.8 billion.

The use to which this phenomenal revenue was put by the recipient governments has been questioned, and most recipients have been charged with disregarding the interests of their people in disbursing these enormous amounts. It has also been argued that the payments by the oil companies represent taxes and their uncontrolled use by the local governments is, therefore, a violation of the principle "No taxation without representation." Another view holds that the poverty of the Middle East stems from the lack of

water, which is not only essential to agricultural development, but also to industrial advancement; hence the misdirection of the funds is not solely responsible for the misery of the people. At any rate, the picture is that of backward countries with few signs of social and economic improvement, and an alliance of foreign companies with the local governments, the latter receiving unprecedented amounts of money and only in most recent times, under political pressure, beginning to apply small portions of it for the benefit of the people.

Despite being "in the Middle East, but not of the Middle East," the oil industry has made a certain impact on the local economies that is not only felt in the direct influx of funds, but also in the training of technicians, subcontractors, and the rise of ancillary local industries. The employees from more advanced countries—Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon and India—are bringing new ideas into the backward areas of oil production. Complications arise: xenophobia, resentment of different living standards, of the high sense of privilege and the low sense of public service combine with struggling for personal and political power. The benefits the oil industry has brought to the hitherto feudal lands of the oil wells have not been unmixed blessing.

The governments of the producing countries are beginning to realize that their oil is a "wasting asset." Since 1944, when Anglo-American discussions on the world's oil reserves were held in Washington, it has been axiomatically asserted that Middle Eastern oil is vital to the political, military, and economic survival of the Western World. This assertion was based on the fact that between 50 and 60 percent of Middle Eastern oil production went to Western Europe where indeed they formed the bulk of oil imports. It took two major interruptions in the flow of Middle Eastern oil to Europe—the Iranian crisis of Mossadegh in 1950 and the Suez campaign in 1956—to disprove the claim of Middle Eastern oil being indispensable to the West. The importance of Middle Eastern oil is receding since the region is losing its significance as the major oil reserve of the world. New discoveries, as in Libya and in the Sahara; prospecting in hitherto untapped areas such as Tunis, Mauretania, Sudan, and other African territories; supplies from Soviet countries; and, last but not least, the potential replacement of fossil fuel in general by new sources of energy are the main contributing factors to the diminishing role of Middle Eastern oil. The expansion of the industry at an annual

rate of 15 percent during the last decade is, therefore, likely to slow down. However, the low production cost of Middle Eastern oil—only 16 cents per barrel average during 1949-1958 as against \$1.66 in the United States and 57 cents in Venezuela—might guarantee its continued use. Nevertheless, the political importance of the Middle Eastern oil has come to an end.

INDUSTRIALIZATION

World War II brought political independence to the countries of the Middle East. With it came the "revolution of rising expectations," the concept that human misery and poverty are not natural and unchangeable. The improvement of intra-regional and international communication strengthened the desire for better material living conditions in the Middle East. The governments of the region feel the pressure for economic improvement and face the difficulties of planning economic development towards western objectives in a setting that lacks western conditions. All development programs in the Middle East focus on industrialization.

The first motif for this concentration is the example of the advanced countries showing military, political, and economic strength based on industries. But the imitation of these models is not the only driving force behind the industrialization plans. They are considered the promising means of absorbing the increasing population into productive activities. There is already much seasonal and latent unemployment in agriculture in the Middle East, bound to increase with additional mechanization of agricultural methods, so that the gap between the living levels of the advanced countries and that of the developing areas is likely to widen instead of becoming narrower unless industries offer new and more remunerative employment. However, the difficulties of industrialization are as great as the need for it may be. The principal problems are interrelated: the beginning of industrialization at a stage when population pressure is heavy while the country is still unable to finance the heavy investment necessary to industrialization without foreign resources and their implications; the larger cost of industrialization today than at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in Europe and in the United States. Great Britain's national income at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution about 200 years ago was probably not much higher than that of Middle Eastern countries today. Yet, Great Britain financed its own industrialization. It is an interesting sub-

ject of speculation whether the success of western industrialization might not, to a large extent, be the result of self-financing.

The Middle East, like other developing countries, is still caught in the vicious circle of having to promote industries and, at the same time, to create an adequate domestic market for its industrial products. For only the existence of a national market will avoid the fluctuations of the international trade over which the producer has little control, particularly if he has to compete with more experienced industrial exporters. Such a domestic market requires conditions beyond a mere subsistence economy in which—as for example in Egypt and Iraq—the majority of the population applies almost 70 percent of their expenditure to unprocessed food. An additional necessity for a growing market is an adequate transportation system depending, in turn, on the volume of traffic it carries, which again is a function of the over-all economic development. Railroads in the Middle East are insufficient. In 1958, there were only 1.5 miles of rail track to each 10,000 population. The comparative figures for Europe and North America were 6.5 and 10 respectively. Road construction in the area was mostly strategically oriented, although road-building programs in most countries have a high priority. Where road and rail facilities are insufficient, aircraft has become the most efficient means of transportation. World War II endowed the Middle East with aerodromes and other landing facilities and these helped to expand air transportation both on trunk and feeder lines. Local aviation in the Middle East has grown so that there is today no country in the region without one or several national and international airlines. Between 1952 and 1957, miles flown increased by 83 percent, passenger miles and cargo miles by approximately 130 percent, mail flown by 100 percent.

The ports of the Middle East, although they progressed considerably between World War I and World War II, are still limited in number and capacity. In the South, Suez and Basra are the only ones of importance, while the oil terminals of Arabia and Iran are single-purpose installations. On the Mediterranean coast, there are Alexandria, Port Said, Haifa, Beirut, Tripoli, Latakia, and Iskenderum. Turkey's largest port, Istanbul, accounts for three quarters of the country's seaborne imports and one-third of its exports. Military improvements during World War II benefited smaller ports such as Basra, Khorramshahr, Bushire, and Bandar Shahpur.

The only water link between Europe and the countries "East of Suez" is the Suez Canal, which connects the eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. The canal provides the most direct route from the East to Europe for raw materials and fuel, and of manufactured goods to the East. The events of 1956 demonstrated the importance of the Suez Canal to Europe and the necessity to find alternatives for this route. The same events also showed the marginal value of the canal to the United States.

River navigation plays a part on the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Tigris. Although none of these rivers can take ocean-going vessels, Egypt's Nile-going boats carry about one quarter of the total inland traffic of cotton, imported fertilizer, and fuel. However, the most important function of the rivers in the Middle East is irrigation, not transportation.

An additional difficulty of mobilizing sufficient funds for industrialization is the political instability of the Middle East, which necessitates considerable military expenditure—50 percent of the ordinary budget in Jordan, 40 in Israel, and 30 in Egypt—which is thus withheld from productive employment. As a result of economic factors—apart from historical, political, and social ones—industry on the whole in the Middle East is still in its infancy unless connected with primary production such as oil, textiles, or citrus fruit processing. Only Israel has more than 10 percent of its population engaged in industries which produce 20 percent of its national income. The industrial employment ratio in other Middle Eastern countries reaches barely 10 percent, and in most cases is below that figure. In Turkey and Lebanon, industry contributes about 15 percent of the national income, in Egypt about 10 percent. In other countries of the region the industrial contribution is negligible. Turkey, Israel, Egypt, and Syria have successfully established light consumer goods industries which in many cases meet the total domestic demand in their line, mainly in textiles and processed food. Most of these industries are "grafted" upon the local economy either by governments or by foreigners and immigrants. Only in the countries of the Levant Littoral is it possible to trace the growth of indigenous industries from an autochthonous artisanate to mechanized production. And in these countries, too, various minorities—Greeks, Jews, Armenians—have the effect of economic catalysts. Elsewhere in the Middle East, lack of education and of capital prevented the tradi-

tional artisan from developing entrepreneurial initiative. These conditions will convey an idea of the difficulties facing the Middle East on its way to improve the living conditions of its people. Even if the countries of the area aim only at an occupational structure comparable to that of industrialized states with still a broad agricultural base like Italy or Japan, where in 1957, 31 and 40 percent respectively of the population earned their livelihood in agriculture, that target would mean a two-and-a-half-fold expansion in industrial employment of the present population in Egypt and Turkey. In view of the already mentioned connection between "Man as Maker" and "Man as Market," such an objective seems, under present conditions, difficult to reach.

FINANCE

The development plans devised by the countries of the Middle East under the pressure of the "population explosion" require substantial funds. In 1951, a United Nations Committee calculated \$1.3 billion as necessary for investment in agriculture and industry to raise the national income by only 2 percent. Taking 1.8 percent as the compounded depreciation rate of the dollar between 1948 and 1958—as the First National City Bank of New York does—this would represent today approximately \$1.5 billion, or, as mentioned before, the present annual equivalent of the total direct oil revenue of the oil-producing countries in the Middle East. Although this calculation shows the financial dimensions of the problem to be not beyond manageability, the situation is aggravated by the fact that accelerated development requires much more money.

While private capital financed the development of the West, its role in the Middle East is subordinate. Private capital in the Middle East, originating from trade and real estate, prefers its traditional sources for investment to industrial ventures or the stock exchange. The reason for this preference are the political, social, and economic complexities of the region, complexities which have prevented the creation of an adequate capital and money market. Banking in the Middle East, unless disbursing public funds, is not a factor in financing development. Hence, the dominant and increasing part of public finance in economic development—40 percent in Turkey, 50 in Israel—with its inherent risks of internal borrowing and inflation. Moreover, most investment goods, machinery and other heavy equipment has to be imported and paid for in

foreign exchange with the result of dwindling foreign exchange reserves, deficiencies in the national balance of payments, and an undervaluation of the national currency abroad.

However, since the end of World War II, the countries of the Middle East have received considerable financial assistance in the form of grants and credits from the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, Japan, and West Germany as well as from international bodies such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the Office of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). In 1959, the aggregate total of these amounts was estimated as approaching \$3 billion. In addition, sterling balances totalling almost \$2 billion had been accumulated in 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, and the Sudan from allied wartime spending in the Middle East. These amounts were a welcome financial reservoir after the end of the war to replenish stocks depleted by wartime scarcities. Under the Mutual Security Agreements with various countries in the Middle East, substantial amounts have been disbursed by the United States for military assistance. A special case of receiving aid is Israel, which obtained reparations from West Germany, charitable contributions, and the proceeds of bond sales, mostly from the United States, at the annual rate of \$150 million.

In the absence of regional arrangements, the part of the oil revenue used for development is disproportionate to the needs of the receiving countries. Egypt and Turkey with the greatest population pressures and the smallest potential of agricultural expansion and, therefore, needing development most, do not receive any oil revenue. On the other hand, the main recipient, Kuwait, has only 200,000 population. Saudi Arabia, a desert country with limited development prospects, has an estimated population of six and a half million—which is probably an overestimate. Its annual oil receipts exceed \$300 million and go mostly to consumption, much of it "conspicuous." Only Iran would classify as a recipient of oil revenue with prospects of its successful application towards development. A recently established Arab Development Bank is expected to receive 5 percent of all oil revenue and thus to take part in a more equitable distribution of oil revenue throughout the entire Middle East.

However, even these substantial receipts from various sources cannot replace the contribution

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The Middle East in Ferment

Emil Lengyel

THE MIDDLE EAST is not a natural unit—is not a continent, a subcontinent, or a region with natural boundaries. It is a part of two continents, Africa and Asia, and even three, if Turkey's narrow Balkans strip is included. The term was coined by the British for administrative convenience and was to include the inchoate region between the eastern Mediterranean and India. No attempt to delineate the region has ever gained acceptance. The "Eisenhower Doctrine," for instance, had to content itself with stating that it was to be applied to the "general area" of the Middle East.

Many Middle Eastern intraregional problems may be considered the projections of this anomaly. The area comprises seven or eight independent Arab countries, depending on how far west one looks in search of the Middle East, also several protectorates on the rim of the great Arab peninsular Quadrangle, and, finally, the non-Arab nations of Iran, Turkey, and Israel. Afghanistan is left out of account because of the limited role she plays in current history.

The Middle East, however, is a unit from the Great Powers' point of view. Britain saw it as an operational area at the high tide of *Pax Britannica*. Her object was to contain Russia in her global icebox and protect her own imperial lifeline in the Mediterranean. Russia saw the Middle East as an escape hatch from the icebox. America's attitude was exemplified by the "Eisenhower Doctrine," the Baghdad Pact and, more recently, CENTO, the Central Treaty Organization of mutual assistance of key Middle Eastern countries. The Soviets have exhibited no reluctance to place their foot in the Middle Eastern door.

This essay will deal with two related problems. One of them is the attempt of some countries of the region to establish a base for integration.

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The other one is the endeavor of the individual nations to raise their living standards and thus strengthen themselves both at home and in their foreign relations.

Two attempts at integration have been made, the one to bring together all the Muslim countries, the other to create Arab unity.

The world of Islam extends for thousands of miles from the Middle East to the Pacific and the Atlantic. The coreland of the Muslim world, however, has been the Middle East, in a part of which its creed was launched. Since many Islamic countries have become independent since World War II, several of them have made tries at integration. Their line of thought has been: Islam is not only a religion but also an all-embracing way of life, the tenets of which regulate the lives of individuals and groups. Pakistan has made two attempts since her establishment to bring about Islamic unity, and both of them have failed. The "Muslim Brotherhood" elsewhere in the Middle East made a similar attempt. In Iran, too, Islam endeavored to create a global pivot for a Muslim religio-secular revival. All of these attempts have been failures because spiritual values in the modern world are only handmaidens of material values, represented by the nation-states.

A far more ambitious intraregional integration was attempted in the heart of the coreland by the Arab countries of the Middle East. The object was to turn the many into one on the assumption that although the individual Arab nations are weak a United Arabia might be strong. These attempts were leaning heavily upon history.

In the middle period of the Middle Ages, the ninth and tenth centuries, the Arab world was alight with both martial and intellectual greatness. Few empires have ever paralleled those of the great Arab realms of the Umayyads and Abbassides. One of the great friends of the Arabs, Glubb Pasha—Sir John Bagot Glubb—former commander of the Arab Legion of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a "soldier with the Arabs," has pointed out that today's Arab countries live in the greatness of their past.

This radiant past was submerged in the dark-

ness of alien rule under the Ottoman empire for several centuries. Then came the era of the Arab awakening at the beginning of our century. A great Arab country was to be established after World War I with British help. Instead of that, the British and their French allies divided the Arab Middle East in the form of mandates—tutelles—combined with training periods for independence.

The Middle Eastern Arab countries attained independence after World War II. In 1945 they formed the Arab League to coordinate their policies on several broad levels. Subsequently they signed a mutual assistance pact. This, however, was not the Arab unity they were craving. Then came President Abdul Nasser of Egypt with his call for Arab greatness. Not since the days of "Aaron the Upright"—Harun-al-Rashid—has the Middle East beheld such a fabulous figure. Through his stentorian "Voice of the Arabs" he was able to appeal to infinitely more people than the medieval Caliph. Millions held with him that unification would restore Arab greatness, food supplies would wax, illiteracy wane, life expectancy grow, and the Arabs would again become a strong power. He spoke of Arab nationalism, from Marakesh to Aden. "To me Arab nationalism means many things," he said. "It is a spiritual drive, a voluntary solidarity of the Arab peoples everywhere based on a common heritage of language, culture and history."

Arab unity was on its way when the United Arab Republic was fashioned out of Egypt and Syria early in 1958. All the other Arab countries would fall into line, it was believed, and the over-riding ambition of the people of the heartland realized. That, however, was not the case. On the contrary, the Arab countries engaged in a campaign of vituperation in a grand battle of adjectives. Arab unification, for the time being at least, came to a jerky halt. What were the reasons?

Geography is one of them. The Arab world consists of isolated concentrations of settlements in the midst of desert land. Speaking of these landlocked areas, the Arabs use the term "island." There is the "island" of the Farthest West in North Africa, and then there are sandgirt "islands" in Syria, the Sudan, and elsewhere. These "islands" are separated by "seas" of arid lands which are far more effective agents of isolation than the Mediterranean which, history shows, has been a link among the Old World continents.

Geology is another natural force to separate

the Arab lands. Some of the Arab areas are sitting on top of the world's largest pools of oil, as the Sheikhdom of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Others have little or nothing of this precious fluid. The oil-rich countries do not want to dilute their wealth with the poverty of the oil-deficiency areas. Also, there is little co-ordination of the transportation systems of the Arab world.

Further impediments to unification are presented by vested interests. The various nations have created institutions of their own, adapted to their special needs. The influential groups in the governmental, social, and economic lives of the countries have generated centrifugal forces. While Nasser seems to have been able to elicit the fanatical devotion of millions of people in the streets, he has repelled the really influential people in the counting houses. He is too much of a "revolutionary" to suit them.

Cultural differences among the Arab countries are also militating against integration. The Kingdom of Yemen, in the southwest corner of the Arab Quadrangle, is just beginning to leap forward from the Stone Age into the Bronze Age, while at the other extreme of the Middle East the urbanized part of the Republic of Lebanon is lining up with the Twentieth Century. There is no common ground between a Sorbonne graduate in Damascus and the nomad in the Hadramaut wastes.

There are also special causes working against unity. Lebanon is Arab but more Christian than Islamic. The Arab way of life includes speaking Arabic, the language of the Koran, which is not the holy script of the Lebanese Christians. The Arab way of life is also a strongly cherished historic memory which for the Muslim Arabs is the stand their ancestors took against the Christian crusaders, presumed ancestors of many Lebanese Arabs.

Within the Arab countries themselves the pulse of events has been racing at an accelerated rate. There are two principal reasons for this acceleration. One of them is a general one, affecting all parts of the globe, and particularly the economically underdeveloped nations. It is the revolution of rising expectations. People today are no longer content with letting fate take its dire course, but want to take matters in their own hands. The other reason for this acceleration is a traumatic event which overwhelmed the Middle Eastern Arab countries.

That event took place in 1948, and history has recorded it as the war in Palestine. In mid-May

of that year the State of Israel was proclaimed, and against it the might of the Arab nations was concentrated. The Arab countries were a vast ocean; Israel was a tiny speck. The Jews were to be overwhelmed and flung into the sea. Instead of that it was they who overwhelmed the Arabs and cast them out of their land.

Until then the Middle Eastern Arab countries were under the rule of the effendi-pasha class. There were the two great poles of polarization—great wealth and abysmal poverty. Wealth was for the few, poverty for the many. A series of revolutions erupted. A reform regime was established in Syria headed at first by Colonel Husni es-Zaim and later by ex-Police Chief Adib Shishakli. However, it was in Egypt that the political earthquake struck the Arab world with full force. The country of the Nile ousted its scapegrace, King Farouk, and established a republican regime. Subsequently, the entire Middle Eastern Arab world erupted—in Iraq, then in Lebanon and, abortively, in the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan. The aim was a basic transformation from the effendi-pasha rule to the people's regime. Jordan remained comparatively immune to the revolutionary wave for two basic reasons. The economic polarization between the rich and the poor was less extreme than in the more populous and settled areas with their atavistic feudal regimes. Also Jordan had the stabilizing backing of outside forces that wanted to have no major upset of the balance of power in the Middle East.

Attempts were made in the Arab countries affected by the revolutionary movement to do away with the extremes of economic and social disequilibrium. Land reforms were introduced under which the large holdings were clipped and the excesses distributed among the poor. Laws were passed to ameliorate the condition of the tenants by lowering rents, opening up channels of credit, and helping in the formation of farmers' cooperatives. It was found that there was a margin of tillable land in all of these countries, and irrigation schemes were introduced. The largest of these was the Aswan High Dam Project in the Arabian Region of the U.A.R., which was to add two million acres to the area's six million acres of arable land. Other land improvement measures were introduced in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Sudan and elsewhere, such as the Wadi Thartar project for the diversion of the flood waters of the Tigris in Iraq.

As the Middle Eastern countries surveyed the world scene, they noticed that national income

and national power were moving hand in hand. In turn, national income could be raised spectacularly through industrial production. They noticed that while land was limited by nature's basic forces, the amount of industrial products could be multiplied at a fantastic rate. Also, they noticed that they were really not free as long as they sold their raw materials to industrial countries and bought finished products from them at a higher price. Industrialization was thus the measure which raised both living standards and national power potential. They all turned to industrialization. The Egyptian Region of the U.A.R. appeared to have a considerable stockpile of technical aptitude, managerial ability, and the national *élan* requisite for a basic transformation of economic life. Lebanon, through her international port of Beirut, was also in constant touch with western ideas and methods. Most of the industries introduced into these countries were of the processing type—food, textile, chemicals, paper. Metallurgical plants and in some cases steel mills were also erected.

The "economic revolution" in the wake of the political one, however, did not extend to the field of integration. The Arab Middle East learned a lot from the West but did not learn the lesson of economic unification as revealed in the European Common Market of six countries and the proposed Free Trade Association of seven more European nations.

The Arab world wanted to unite but was not able to get a start on the economic level. At the Arab Petroleum Congress which met in Cairo in April 1959, the delegate of Lebanon recommended that living standards could be raised all around in the Arab world if a percentage of the oil revenues—he mentioned 5 percent—were allocated to an Arab Development Bank engaged in the task of financing socially and economically fruitful regional undertakings. His words, however, found no echo. It was noticed that the recommendation was made by a spokesman of one of the Arab oil-poor countries, while the representatives of the oil-rich nations kept mum.

One significant trait characterized the revolutions of the Middle Eastern Arab countries. They were led by the professional army officer class and, in most cases, officers remained at the helm. The explanation of this development was offered by the countries' social structure. The officers represented the only class that was not directly involved in the management of the previous regimes and, hence, they were not discredited. The revolutionary leaders were, in

numerous cases, offspring of the lower social echelons. Lebanon remained the only Middle Eastern Arab country with a parliamentary regime. Jordan also had a parliament which, however, came increasingly under central control. President Nasser declared that eventually his country would reach the parliamentary stage.

Two of the major Islamic countries of the Middle East—Turkey and Iran—are not Arabic. The Arabs are indigenous to the region, their ancestral home having been in the depths of the Quadrangle. The Turks, on the other hand, came from Central Asia, and they reached the Middle East in the Middle Age. They do not speak a Semitic tongue, as the Arabs do, but an Ural-Altayan language, which is one of the most important groups in all of Asia.

The Iranians have also been for a long time in their present location and they are celebrating 2,500 years of their continuous existence in the current year. The language they speak, Persian, is neither Semitic, as that of the Arabs, nor Ural-Altayan, as that of the Turks, but Indo-European or "Aryan," as are most of the languages of the western world.

Turkey made a vast impact on the western world in the early twenties of the current century. She was the first country to turn away from the ways of the East and towards the ways of the West—*Ex Occidente Lux*. She forsook the eastern way of following the ways of the Koran, and followed the ways of modern nationalism. This dramatic change was accomplished under the leadership of the founder of Republican Turkey after World War I, Mustapha Kemal, whom his countrymen were to honor with the name of "Father of the Turks"—Ataturk. The massive reforms he launched have been imitated by many epigenes.

It was Ataturk who made his countrymen doff the fez and don the hat. However, he believed that what was in the head was far more important than what was on it. He believed that the ways of democracy were best, but he also realized that its application called for a training period. He established the Republican People's Party which, later, was to alternate in power with another political party. He died in 1938, and it took several years before Turkey appeared to be ready for the two-party system. It was in 1950 that the opposition Democratic Party of Turkey won the national election in a landslide.

The Republican Party of Turkey was more like the Democratic Party of the United States, and the Democratic Party of Turkey was more

like the Republican Party of America. The differences between the two parties were considerable. Under the Republican Party it was realized that Turkey was short of private capital and that therefore the funds provided by the nation had to fill the gap. This was a form of State capitalism, or, as the Turks called it, *étatisme*. Under this system the Turks were not doing too badly, and they started to build up the foundations of modest industries.

The Democratic Party, on the other hand, believed in the capitalist system of the West. However, it was difficult to introduce the capitalist system without adequate capital. Turkey came to depend upon the United States, which dispatched to Ankara, capital of the country, apostles of free enterprise. In its name, the Turkish governments launched a campaign of industrialization and agricultural improvements. A large number of tractors were introduced into the country. In Turkey there had been no extreme polarization of the Arab type. On the Anatolian high plateau, particularly, the small farm was the dominant type. However, tractors were profitable only on large units of land. Credits were made available and tractors were acquired. Small farms could not compete with the mechanized ones, and the small farmers had to sell their lands to the village nabobs, the *agas*. Under the aegis of free enterprise, the peasant equality of the Anatolian highlands began to fade. Also, Turkey's industrialization was too fast for her resources.

The most important spokesman for the new age was Premier Adnan Menderes, who was also head of the Democratic Party. Under his regime a large number of restrictive laws were introduced—muzzling the press, parliamentary discussion, and political opposition. He ran into much opposition, especially on the part of the younger generation and, in particular, the enlightened student body of the universities. Students revolted against the Menderes clique.

It was the policy of Menderes to have the United States underwrite his regime by denouncing the opposition as subversive. However, America began to realize that it was an anomalous situation to have Turkey serve as the bastion of the free world. The authorities in Washington also saw that the policies of Menderes were, in effect, discrediting the policies for which the free world stood. Menderes lost his powerful supporters in the West.

His regime came to an end in the bloodless revolution of the spring of 1960. In Turkey, too,

army officers seized power. They were headed by General Cemal Gursel, Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces. He also became Head of the State and of the Government, President-Premier. He did away with the restrictive laws of the previous regime, had its leaders arrested, and promised a new deal in the spirit of the late Kemal Ataturk. He retired more than 200 officers of high rank in the summer of 1960 as a measure to rejuvenate the country's armed forces. In some quarters it was felt that this may have also been a measure to head off a possible palace revolution in the ranks of the big brass.

Meanwhile, Turkey's relations with the rest of the Middle East remained in a state of flux. The Turks, who once ruled over their Arab coreligionists under the Ottoman Empire, still retain a tendency to look down upon them. The Arabs, however, see the Turks as copycats—they had adopted the Arabs' creed and script—and distrust them. A conflict between the United Arab Republic and the Turks was brewing over a strip of land centering around the northeastern Mediterranean port of Iskenderun (Alexandretta) which had belonged to the Ottoman Empire, had been acquired by Syria, and was returned to Turkey shortly before the outbreak of World War II by the French who exercised mandatory rights in that Arab country. A claim for the return of this region was made by President Nasser. To this claim, General Gursel gave a dramatic reply: "Rest easy in the knowledge," he addressed his nation, "that should any hand reach out for Hatay [the Turkish name of the area] the entire Turkish nation will be there to break that hand. . . ."

In relation with other parts of the Middle East, Turkey was the only Muslim country which maintained normal relations in trade and diplomacy with Israel.

The "revolution of rising expectations" also reached Iran, where industrialization, begun in the inter-bellum period, continued, and where one of the most ambitious Middle Eastern "T.V.A." systems was established in the southwest of the country, Khuzistan, where a series of dams were to produce 6 million kilowatts and irrigate 2.5 million acres. Mohammed Khan Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, concentrated much power in his hands. He exercised this power by a judicious use of "divide and rule" of the dominant elements in the country—rich landowners, members of the great families, the incipient middle class, known as the "bazaar," the army and other armed forces, and the influential religious

teachers. Iran was the only country in the Middle East very little affected by the social and political revolution which has been swirling over the Middle East. Nominally, the country was a parliamentary democracy, with the *Majlis*, the legislature, in the driver's seat. In reality the great feudal families wielded most of the power. The Shah made some attempts to control them but was more often controlled by them.

Israel, a small nation of about eight thousand square miles, the size of New Jersey, is only physically in the Middle East. In reality she appears to be a projection of the West into the East, having a per capita annual income of roughly \$700, a literacy rate of 94 percent, and a firmly based parliamentary democracy. Of historical necessity, as well as by conviction, her foreign policy is attuned to that of the West.

It was out of the West, of course, that modern Zionism—a movement to restore Israel to the Jewish people—emerged. The idea that the Jews and the land of Israel were indissolubly linked persisted from the day the Romans sacked Jerusalem in 70 A.D., and Jews continued to regard Palestine as their spiritual haven throughout their dispersion. However, with the creation of the World Zionist Organization in 1897, in Basel, Switzerland, under Theodore Herzl, national striving superseded religious yearning, and the movement achieved political status. Its practical test was passed earlier, when the first group of Jewish colonists reached Palestine from Russia in 1882.

In the last 60 years the steps on the road to Zion, both forward and backward, are well-known. A great forward move was represented by the Balfour Declaration, which pledged the British government to support "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." This Declaration was incorporated in the terms of the League of Nations mandate over Palestine, awarded in 1922 to the United Kingdom.

The Zionist community under the mandate grew to 650 thousand. But this expansion provoked rising Arab hostility, and a British White Paper, issued at the beginning of World War II, severely restricted Jewish immigration. Arab-Jewish violence, and international backing for the idea of a Jewish state (greatly stimulated by the Nazi massacres), finally persuaded the British to abandon the mandate and hand Palestine over to the United Nations.

On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly recommended the partition of

Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, each politically sovereign but economically united. Jerusalem was to be an international city. On May 14, 1948, the Jews who had accepted the partition plan, proclaimed the State of Israel. At the same time, armies from the Arab League states invaded Palestine. The attack was beaten off and armistice agreements were concluded in 1949 between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

But there was to be little ease in Zion for the Israelis. Arab hostility continued, exacerbated by the plight of the Arab refugees—i.e., the several hundred thousand Palestinian Arabs who fled across the borders during the war and now insisted on their "right to return." There were sporadic border outbreaks. An intensive diplomatic and economic offensive—expressed through boycotts, "blacklists" and a blockade of the international Suez Canal—was waged by the Arab states against Israel.

And there were serious economic problems. Chief among these was the influx of nearly a million new Jewish immigrants, many from the Arab world, and most moneyless and unskilled. Large outlays had to be made by the government for schools, hospitals, social welfare and other programs. The effort to pay for these services, to meet the needs imposed by national security, and to maintain high living standards, required a major expansion of the economy, which in turn required heavy imports of machinery and raw materials. As a result, Israel is still dependent on financial assistance from abroad.

In the face of all these difficulties, the record of achievement is an impressive one. By the end of the first decade of its existence, Israel had established some 450 agricultural settlements, doubled the number of its industrial enterprises,

and made notable progress in housing, transportation, and the exploitation of natural resources. The balance of payments began to tilt somewhat less unfavorably, as the percentage of imports covered by exports steadily increased. On the military front, the lightning Sinai campaign in 1956 lessened the dangers of a renewed Arab attack.

Ever since Israel emerged as a new nation, her Arab neighbors have charged that she was artificial, illegitimate, and temporary, and should, as a consequence, be cast out of the Middle East. Israel, they asserted, was maintained only by the financial contribution of Jews elsewhere, particularly in the United States, and by a cabal of western powers. An analysis of the unrelenting warfare against Israel seemed to reveal that she was resented because she was more successful than her Arab neighbors. She was going places, raising the living standards of her people by leaps and bounds. The Arab neighbors did not seem to realize that their own progress would be accelerated if they were at peace with a country which occupied a very important transportation nodal point. Also, the neighbors did not realize that if peace prevailed in the area, they could devote the funds they were spending on a fruitless arms race to national development programs. As to the charge that Israel was supported by Jews elsewhere in the world, it was pointed out that mutual aid among the Arabs, too, would serve a useful purpose. The oil-rich Arab countries' contributions to the economic development of the oil-poor nations would be a boon all around.

There was a time when the Middle East made enormous contributions to the knowledge of the Western world. Today, the Middle East is in ferment, and there is room for hope that this area will once again contribute greatly.

GEOGRAPHY OF THE MIDDLE EAST

(Continued from page 19)

seen the Middle East as an area of physical diversity inhabited by a variety of people living in various ways, creating a complex upon which generalization at once is both difficult and misleading. Livelihood from the land is the basis of Middle Eastern culture, as practiced in different ways. The strength of the Middle East lies in the attitude of the peasant toward agriculture and of the nomad toward his flocks, a consequence of

the dual background of history and geography. Natural resources and transportation facilities are largely lacking; the Industrial Revolution has passed the Middle East by. The presence of vast quantities of petroleum, however, may change the entire economy of the area and raise the standards of living of the people, but it will probably not alter significantly the agricultural basis of life.

Religion in the Middle East

John S. Badeau

THE MIDDLE EAST begins each day with the voice of religion. While dawn is still on the horizon, the Call to Prayer sounds from the minaret, bidding men "rise and pray; come to prayer, come to salvation—for prayer is better than sleep."

Not everyone responds, of course. Jews and Christians have their own customs of worship, though this audible and ubiquitous Muslim summons cannot fail to remind them of the claims of their own faiths. And even the Muslim community has those who turn deaf ears. While the commonality is still deeply religious, the intellectual elite are prey to the same forces of modernity and secularism that are so familiar in the Western world. Yet religion remains a basic dimension of Middle East life. Even those who deliberately or tacitly grow cold toward their inherited faith act within a framework of ideas and values in whose creation religion has played a predominant role. An understanding of religion in the Middle East is essential to an understanding of Middle Eastern life.

For the past 13 centuries the religious life of the Middle East has centered in the three faiths of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, to list them by date. The order of this listing is important for more than historic accuracy; it has theological implications, since each of the two later religions claims to supersede its predecessor. As Christians believe that their faith purified and completed Judaism, so Muslims claim that Islam completed the partial truths of Christianity. Underlying these theological claims is the objective fact that all three religions belong to the same family of faith. Historically and ideologically they are closely connected; for all their differences they share many basic outlooks and dogmas. Their center is a deeply personal and monotheistic view of God, and their moral codes have marked similarity.

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These three faiths took the field from the medley of cults and gods that filled the ancient Near East. Judaism was never more than the religion of a small group of Near Eastern people, but in its heyday Christianity filled the area eastward to the borders of Persia and the Arabian desert. After the seventh century A.D. Christianity gradually surrendered its territories to rising Islam, which finally extended its conquest far beyond the borders of the Middle East.

The Christian-Islamic occupation wiped out overt forms of the older religions. Today there are only two groups in the Middle East that can be identified as continuations of the pre-Christian cults. One is a small community in Iraq known as Sabaeans (often incorrectly named "John the Baptist Christians") whose central rites can be traced back to Babylonian star worship. The other group is the Zoroastrian community in Iran, remnants of the once-dominant faith of the Persian Empire in its Sassanian and Parthian periods. This is a sister group to the small but important Parsee community in India.

Although Christianity and Islam thus appear to have obliterated the preceding faiths, popular religion bears traces of practices which have lived on since ancient days. A careful study of village folkways would reveal customs now accepted as Christian or Muslim that are in reality only the continuation of pagan rites. One evidence of this is the tendency of a site to remain sacred through all the changes of outward faith. For instance, Baalbek (Lebanon) was a center of baal worship, Roman paganism, a Christian church—and now of a mosque where services go on today.

JUDAISM

The general content and practice of Judaism is too well known to need repetition. The Jewish communities in the Middle East are composed of three groups. First is the indigenous group, many of whom trace their origin back to the original dispersion of the Jews after the Assyrian and Babylonian conquests of ancient Israel. The most important of these has been in Iraq, which was the home of the first Jewish exiles. Another group has been in Yemen, where in pre-Islamic

days there was a Jewish kingdom. Such Jews are often called "Oriental" because, in habit and outlook, they are strongly marked by the general characteristics of the East, equally shared with Christians and Muslims. Their religious and social practices are very conservative and traditional in contrast to much Western Judaism.

A second group came into the Middle East from Spain, as a result of persecutions that accompanied the reestablishment of Christian rule in the Spanish peninsula in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. At that time, the Muslim world was considerably more tolerant toward its minorities than the Christian West and welcomed Jews who sought refuge among them. This group is found principally in North Africa, Egypt, and Turkey. Some of them still retain in their homes traces of the medieval Spanish language of their forefathers.

The third group is made up of Jews from Central and Western Europe, victims of contemporary persecution. Especially during the Hitler regime, such refugees came to any Middle East country that would receive them. In contrast to the generally orthodox and religiously-minded outlook of the Oriental Jews, these represent a more secularized, and certainly a more modern, religious outlook.

The creation of the modern state of Israel has profoundly affected both the status and the religious faith of Eastern Jewish groups. When they migrate to Israel, they turn their back upon centuries of minority status to become part of an independent national community. In this community they mingle with Jews from many other lands and are subject to the modernizing influences that come from Western Jewry. Israel has not yet solved the problem of how to amalgamate the religiously minded and conservative Eastern Jew with the more secularly oriented Western immigrant. It is this problem that is partly responsible for the difficulty of determining what the place of religion shall be in the Constitution of the state. Moreover, the rise of Israel and the tensions within the Arab world that accompany it have deeply eroded the historic relation between Eastern Jewish communities and the Muslim societies in which they live. On the whole, this relation was tolerant—especially in contrast to the record of medieval Christianity. Jews have played an important intellectual and economic role in many Muslim countries and made notable contributions to the development of the great medieval Arab culture. Not unnaturally, the protracted struggle be-

tween the surrounding Arab states and Israel and the claim of Israel to speak for Jewish communities everywhere has tended to throw suspicion upon the Jewish communities still remaining in Arab lands. These communities are now dwindling; large scale immigration to Israel from Iraq, Yemen, and Egypt has reduced the Jewish groups in these countries to only a fraction of their former size.

CHRISTIANITY

Although once the dominant faith of the Middle East (except in Persia and the Arabian Peninsula), Christianity now claims less than 5 percent of the population. Lebanon is the only country in which Christians approximate 50 percent of the population; in other countries they are a small minority.

The Christian communities of the Middle East can be separated into four groups. The first is the Orthodox; this represents remnants of the official faith of the Byzantine Empire at the time it was overrun by the Arabs in the Seventh Century A.D. In Egypt and Turkey Orthodoxy is found chiefly among the Greek colonies, many of whom have lived there for centuries. In Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria there are Arabic-speaking Orthodox Christians who trace their origin back to the pre-Islamic period.

The second group, and the largest, is composed of theological variants of the Eastern orthodox church, although their origin was more often in nationalistic feeling, rather than in theological conviction. The cause of their differences was the difficulty of the ancient church in defining the exact relationship of the human and divine character of Christ. In the fourth and fifth century, church councils enunciated a position that has ever since been the basis of both Eastern and Western (Roman Protestant) belief. However, some of the Christian groups continued to adhere to repudiated views, partly as a national protest against the Byzantine church and its imperial domination. At one extreme stand the Nestorians, who so separated the divine and human nature of Christ that two entities emerged—the human Jesus and the eternal divine Word. Nestorianism was a strongly missionary faith and in ancient days carried its message into India and China. Today it is represented by the Assyrian communities in Iraq, Syria, and Iran.

Opposite the Nestorians stand the Monophysites. This name means "of one nature" and is used for the belief that, although Jesus was both

human and divine, the two aspects were contained in one unified personality. The Monophysite group includes the Coptic Church of Egypt, the Church of Ethiopia, the Syrian Orthodox Church (sometimes called Jacobite) and the Armenian Church. Although of similar theological outlook, these churches are not organized into a single group; each is the remnant of a once national church, as some of their names suggest.

The third group is composed of churches from the Orthodox and separatist communities who have accepted the rule of the Roman Pope and repudiated the heretical portions of their theology. These are called the Uniate churches and include the Greek Catholic, Coptic Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Chaldean and Maronite churches. Feeling between the eastern churches and the Uniates is so strong that many of the eastern group refuse to use the Western calendar of Christian feasts because this was evolved under the Roman papacy. Consequently there are two Christmases and two Easters in most Middle East countries.

The fourth group of Eastern Christians is made up of the various Protestant denominations, each the result of Western missionary work. They are small in number, but have had a profound influence on the Eastern churches through introducing such modern religious practices as sermons in the vernacular, Sunday schools, and social programs.

Traditionally, both the Jewish and Christian minority groups have occupied a "protected" status within the Muslim society that surrounds them. They conduct their own community affairs, have their own courts for judging matters of personal status (marriage, divorce and inheritance), and are guaranteed the right to conduct their own worship in peace. With the rise of nationalism and its emphasis on state loyalty, some of this religious autonomy is disappearing—as in Turkey and the United Arab Republic, where the religious courts of all sects have been abolished.

ISLAM

The majority faith of the Middle East is Islam, which embraces approximately 96 percent of the population. Islam itself is divided into two major branches—Sunni and Shia. Shia Islam is the smaller sect, represented in the Middle East by Iran, the southern part of Iraq, and groups scattered in other countries. The original cause for the division was largely political—a reaction

of the Persians against Arab domination. The chief theological difference lies in the theory of religious and political leadership, the Shias believing that this is a function to be exercised only by the descendants of Mohammed, through the line of his son-in-law, Ali, while the Sunnis maintain that it is the prerogative of any member selected by the community at large.

To give a detailed description of Islam is a task as vast and intricate as similarly describing the whole of Christianity. Like Christianity, it has an extensive theology, a multiplicity of sects, and a variety of religious outlooks that run from the crude and superstitious beliefs of simple people to the rational and philosophical convictions of the educated. However, there is a core of central religious beliefs and practices that are shared by all Muslims and from which Islam derives its unique content.

Foremost of these beliefs is the name given to the religion. "Islam" was Mohammed's own term for the faith he brought; it means "submission" or "surrender." For the Muslim, life is based upon his acceptance of and surrender to God's way—in contrast to the way of man. Those who make this acceptance are called "Muslims," meaning "the surrendered ones." Westerners often incorrectly call the followers of Islam "Mohammedans" and their religion "Mohammedism."

"God's way" to which the Muslim has surrendered is that made known through the prophetic mission of Mohammed, an Arab who lived in Mecca during the seventh century A.D. His inspired utterances form the sacred scripture, the Koran, which is a book of approximately the same length as the New Testament. Koran means "recitations" and reflects the fact that its contents are made up of Mohammed's words when he believed himself to be under the spell of divine inspiration. For the Muslim, the Koran is the literally and directly inspired word of God, containing the answer to all basic questions of faith and practice.

From the Koran and its interpretation the Muslim is taught that the center of his faith is an unquestioning belief in one—and only one—deity, to whom there is no partner. To this is added acceptance of the prophetic role of Mohammed (and other prophets who preceded him) and of the scripture (supremely the Koran, then the earlier scriptures of the Jews and Christians). Other articles of faith include belief in the Last Judgment, in predestination, and in angelic beings both good and evil.

To the articles of faith are added the five basic duties required of every Muslim. These are: 1) the repetition of the creed "There is no God but God and Mohammed is the apostle of God"; 2) the performance of ritual prayer five times daily; 3) fasting from daybreak to sunset during the month Ramadan; 4) payment of alms for the support of the poor; and 5) making a pilgrimage to Mecca once during a lifetime.

Of course the Muslim does not stop with these duties. The Koran provides many moral exhortations that the believer must heed in conducting his life. Care of orphans, honesty in business transactions, kindness to brothers in the faith, just treatment of wives and children, are all enjoined in the Koran. These teachings, elaborated by theologians and added to by the reported Traditions of the Prophet Hadith, evolved into an elaborate system of personal morality and legal codes which governed the Muslim community.

But Islam is much more than a way of life for the individual. Fundamentally it conceives of an entire community, expressing through its corporate life a will of God for man. This means that Islam includes the theory of government, a set of social practices, legal codes and community institutions, in the midst of which each individual Muslim is set. The individualized concept of religion common in our Western world is alien to historic Islam, which would find it difficult to believe that God had a will for separate persons apart from a will for society as a whole.

It is this corporate aspect of Islam that both provides much of its strength and occasions many of its problems in the modern world. Its strength comes from the fact that the individual is molded and supported in his personal life by a total community. That community specifies individual religious responsibilities in all the practical spheres of daily life—politics, family, business, and social activity. The dichotomy between individual faith and the "world" which has been so disturbing to the West finds less place in historic Islam. One scholar summarizes this by saying, "Islam is neither a state religion nor a religion of the state—but a religion which is a state." This means that, at least in theory, the whole of

human activity has religious connotations to the Muslim. Inevitably therefore political, social and economic questions have religious overtones in the Muslim world.

At the same time the community aspect of Islam gives rise to profound spiritual problems. For when religion is imbedded in and identified with culture, the social order, politics, and economics, radical changes in these spheres of life inescapably impact upon the spiritual core of religion. Such changes are penetrating the Muslim world with increasing force and rapidity. In general, they can be lumped together under the concept of the modern, national state. This includes nationalism as the basic political concept, industrialization with its problems of capital and labor, changes in social customs involving the status of women, the spread of popular education and the loss of prerogatives by the old elite class, and substitution of Western secular legal codes for the religiously based law of the past.

The clearest example of such changes are in the various revolutionary movements in the Middle East. A generation ago, Turkey repudiated its medieval past and adopted the pattern of the modern, secular, national state. The Egyptian Revolution and the Kassem coup d'état in Iraq are motivated by a similar objective—although this has not been as openly and theoretically expressed. Such revolutionary programs in politics and society profoundly change the community role of Islam. Many of the institutions of the *ancien régime* which these revolutions attack are identified with the historic Muslim system and it is therefore almost impossible to build a modern state and society without rejecting many institutions which in the past have been Islamic.

It is this situation that makes it difficult to state exactly what the role of Islam will be in the new Middle East that is gradually emerging. As a personal faith, Islam has vigor and vitality. As a constituent of the glorious civilization of the past, it is both a matter of pride and a subtle influence affecting the most modern-minded Muslim. But as a community structure, it has yet to find its new role in relation to the secular nationalism implicit in many modern Middle East developments.

"The use of travelling is to regulate imagination by reality, and instead of thinking how things may be, to see them as they are."—Samuel Johnson

Murals of the Middle East in Our Minds

Leonard S. Kenworthy

MANY MASTERPIECES of painting have been retouched so often by amateurs that the outer layers must be removed before the originals can be seen. This is a delicate and dangerous process but a necessary one in order to reveal the painting of the master artist.

A similar task confronts social studies teachers who want to help students discover the truth about the Middle East. The murals of that part of the world in the minds of most students, and often of teachers, are filled with a curious assortment of stereotypes daubed on in brilliant colors by motion picture producers, Sunday supplement writers, and well-meaning but often misinformed Sunday School teachers and ministers.

These murals usually include harems filled with Hollywood starlets flimsily clad in nylon dresses and imitation jewelry, wild looking saints with streaks of lightning flashing over their heads, modern monarchs streaking by in Cadillacs or racing cars, and street mobs decapitating their most recent ruler.

Removing such stereotypes is a delicate and difficult task requiring creative social studies teaching. Even then the truth may not be found. But the canvas or canvases may be relatively clean and a more accurate mural or series of murals can then be painted of this complex, colorful, creative, and sometimes chaotic part of the world.

Space will not permit the writer to do more than sketch with broad strokes a few of the murals that should be in our minds. The details will have to be filled in by social studies teachers

and students, making much use of rich browns, blues, and greens—favorite colors of this part of the world.

Here, then, are eight murals on the Middle East:

Mural One: The Land and Resources. This mural is painted against a background map of the Middle East, with the borders of the mural very faint in order to remind people of the indefinite geographical boundaries of this area.

In a central position is a mountain peak which serves as a representation of such mountains as the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan, the Taurus and Anti-Taurus mountains of Iran, and the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon peaks of Lebanon and Syria, as well as the plateau character of much of this entire area.

Next to this peak is a large, flat area painted in many shades of brown, with an occasional green oasis breaking the expanse. This reminds us of the importance of such deserts as the Arabian, Syrian, and Sahara.

There is a bright green, horseshoe-shaped symbol of the Fertile Crescent, but there are also ugly ravines and giant chasms showing the effect of erosion over the centuries. With a sense of humor, but also with a serious purpose in mind, the painter has included a goat—one of the deadliest enemies of conservation in the Middle East.

The rim of this mural seems at first sight to be a continuous blue line, representing such bodies of water as the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, the Black and Caspian Seas, and the Persian Gulf. And there are three broad strokes in blue in the center of the mural which depict the Nile, the Tigris, and the Euphrates rivers.

Finally, one's eyes catch the tiny oil derricks which dot this mural, the fields of grain, cotton, and tobacco, the citrus fruit orchards, the sheep and camels and horses, and an occasional mining operation for such products as chrome, potassium, and copper.

This article is a companion piece to "The New Map of Africa in My Mind," which appeared in the March 1960 issue of *Social Education*. Dr. Kenworthy is Professor of Education at Brooklyn College and the author of several books, including *Leaders of New Nations* (Doubleday and Company, 1959) and *Profile of Nigeria* (Doubleday, 1960).

At the edge of the mural we see the bare outlines of Europe, Africa, and Asia, reminding us of the strategic location of this area as a cross-roads of continents throughout history.

Mural Two: The People and Their Ways of Living. This mural seems to be a montage of many groups of people engaged in a variety of activities. As we glance quickly across the canvas we see a group of men seated at tables in a coffee-house, sipping their thick, black coffee while they listen to the radio installed in one corner. Then we spot a group of women and children drawing water from the village well and chatting with each other. Nearby is a camel caravan passing through the Khyber Pass between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The largest figure is a peasant farmer on a tiny plot of ground breaking the soil with an old-fashioned wooden plow. He is a symbol of the 75 percent of the population in this part of our globe who engage in primitive farming. In a later mural we shall see his modern counterpart.

Then there are groups of school children and university students, shoppers in open bazaars or souks and in large, modern stores, and groups of men working in oil refineries, textile mills, and small factories producing everything from rope, made from the jute of Pakistan, to sugar.

In one corner the painter has sketched several types of homes, ranging from the very common flat-roofed structures to modern apartment houses in such rapidly growing cities as Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Karachi, Teheran, and Tel-Aviv. A closer look reveals a kibbutz in Israel, a refugee camp, a group of tents of Bedouin nomads, and the bee-hive looking houses of northern Syria.

If we could hear the people in this mural talking, there would be a predominance of Arabic, even though it would represent several dialects. But we would also hear Turkish, Persian, Hebrew, Urdu, French, English, and many other tongues.

We have not lingered long in front of this mural, but its central theme of *variety* has been made.

Mural Three: Their Religions. This is a more simple mural in which the painter has given the central position to the famous Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, a sacred spot to Jews, Christians, and Moslems, hoping thereby to show the common features of these three world faiths which had their origins in the Middle East.

In smaller pictures he shows a mosque, a church, and a synagogue and adds the crescent, the cross, and the Star of David as symbols of these three religions.

In order not to complicate the picture, he has obviously omitted any mention of the divisions within each of these three groups, but this is a detail which we can study for ourselves.

Historically, Zoroastrianism also had its beginnings in this part of the globe, but its adherents now live for the most part in India and Pakistan, where they are known as Parsees.

Had the painter wished to dwell on the divisive aspects of religion, he could have portrayed the fighters in the Crusades, the 14 million refugees in Pakistan and India at the time of partition, and the hostilities between Jews and Arabs in the last few years as a result of the partition of Palestine.

Mural Four: Their Governments. In the background of this mural are the flags of all the nations of the Middle East. Many of them are in the process of being raised, which is the painter's method of reminding us that many of these countries are new nations.

In the center is a large and deep chasm, and around it the leaders are precariously grouped as if they might fall into the abyss any moment. Obviously this is a reference to the vacuum which existed when the Western European nations pulled out of this part of the world politically after World War II.

In one group are King Saud of Saudi Arabia, King Idris of Libya, King Hussein of Jordan, King Zahir of Afghanistan, and King Pahlavi of Iran. Close by are Colonel Nasser of Egypt, Abdul Karim Kassem of Iraq, General Cemal Gursel of Turkey, General Fuad Chehab of Lebanon, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan, and Lieutenant General Ibrahim Abboud of the Sudan. Cut off from the rest by a barbed-wire fence is David Ben-Gurion of Israel, an isolated figure in the midst of the Arab world.

In the background are many figures, some of them elder statesmen, some of them soldiers, and some of them groups of men and women taking part in orderly elections.

In the northeast part of this mural is a hand, reaching into Afghanistan, and in the western part of the mural is a large oil tanker, representing the interest of Russia and also of France, England, and the United States in this area. Two large question marks and the initials AL and CENTO make one pause to consider the impor-

tance of the Arab League and the Central Treaty Organization in this area.

Mural Five: Their Economies. At the center of this mural is a huge bar graph showing the per capita income of the various countries of the Middle East. Because of its oil production, Kuwait leads with \$1600 per person per year (but actually not so equally divided), Israel comes next with \$800, followed by Lebanon and Turkey with \$250 each. The others are approximately \$100 or less per person per year.

This might be enough to cause considerable contemplation about the economics of this area, but the painter has gone further.

On one side of the bar graph he has shown groups of farmers working on poor soil and with poor seeds and tools. Near them are craftsmen producing beautiful objects but earning little income. The house of a wealthy landlord points to the archaic land systems of most countries, with, for example, one thousand families owning until recently 70 percent of the land of Iran. Here again are the tents and shacks of nearly a million refugees, most of them still not employed.

On the other side of the bar graph the painter has placed some of the more promising economic developments of this region. Here is a dam under construction, representing such new dams as the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, the Habbaniya and Wadi Tharthar projects on the Tigris and Euphrates in Iraq, and the various dams on the Indus in West Pakistan. Here, too, is a figure of "50-50" which represents the new division of profits from oil sales between the local country and the foreign oil company in a majority of instances. A group of factories stands for the light industries which are beginning to appear in most countries, especially in Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, Syria, and Turkey. The stick figure of a man with an arm band marked "U.N." represents the use of technical assistance from that international body in the Middle East.

The painter has made his point that this whole area is economically underdeveloped but that there has been some progress in making the economies of most of these nations viable.

Mural Six: Their Education. On this panel there are seven groups of people representing various approaches to education in the Middle East. One is a Koranic school with a group of boys studying together, the major educational effort in most places until recent times. Along-

side it is a group of university students, reminding the viewers of the ancient centers of learning, among them Cairo's Al-Azhar, which preserved and advanced medicine, architecture, mathematics, and other fields for centuries—and which still exist. A third is a small mission school with boys and girls studying together, symbolizing the contribution that such schools have made over a long period, exemplified by such American-sponsored schools as the American University of Beirut and Roberts College. A fourth picture shows a small but new school with boys and girls together in the classrooms, a symbol of the growing number of children in classrooms of elementary schools. A fifth picture is of a Rural Institute in Turkey, a promising attempt of that country to develop teachers for rural areas by training them in the country rather than in the cities. The sixth picture is of a technical institute, a much needed type of school in this whole area and one which is gaining in numbers and in prestige. The last picture is of groups of adults gathered around radios and movie screens, as examples of two of the methods used by almost all the countries to decrease adult illiteracy.

Mural Seven: Their History. This mural is of a very different type from the others. It looks like a mammoth procession of people along the "Highway of History," carrying different banners and dressed in many different kinds of clothes. Along the highway are milestones giving the dates of each group. In this way the painter has tried to depict the long, unbroken history of the Middle East from the days of the ancient Egyptians, Sumerians, Hittites, Assyrians, and Babylonians through the eras of the Persians, Greeks, Romans, and Arabs to the Crusades, and on through the hegemony of the Ottomans to the period of Western European domination and the present period of nationalism and independence. It is a colorful pageant which makes us aware again that these have been the countries of the conquered as well as the countries of the conquerors throughout more than 5,000 years of recorded history—a fact which should never be forgotten in trying to understand or to interpret the Middle East.

Mural Eight: Their Contributions to the World. In this mural the painter has reproduced a beautiful room with a ribbed ceiling and delicately patterned mosaics. On the floor he has placed a magnificent Persian rug. On the rug he has placed a variety of items, including books

of mathematics, medical instruments, books of fables, a chess board, the alphabet, a lute, guitar and tambourine, a small telescope, a few garden tools, some choice pieces of pottery and some Persian miniatures, leather figures representing Arab Shadow Plays, the Koran and Bible, a few pieces of lace and brocade, some silver enamels and a miniature boat to represent the Phoenicians and their daring exploits as traders. In small letters in the foreground he has placed the phrase, "Creators and Brokers of Civilization."

AIMS AND METHODS

In any teaching assignment, as in many other aspects of life, it is important to have clear aims—and a limited number of them. In the foregoing part of this article the writer has attempted to select eight major aims for any study of the Middle East. Readers may not agree with the choice, but they are encouraged to think through the major aspects to be stressed as they look at this part of the world.

With young children it is probably advisable to concentrate largely on the people of the Middle East and their ways of living, trying to understand that they are interesting human beings, carrying on the same activities as Americans—but often in different ways. With older boys and girls, the emphasis should be upon facing similar problems, and finding different solutions owing to history, geography, economics, and philosophy.

If it is decided to study a variety of countries, teachers are urged to develop depth rather than breadth. There are so many aspects to the study of any country that it is impossible to do justice to a single nation in less than two or three weeks. It seems better, therefore, to limit the number of nations to be examined rather than to encourage a superficial study of several countries.¹

Many methods should be used in a study of the Middle East as in studies of any part of the globe. The interest of different pupils will be aroused through different methods. Furthermore, no one method can possibly cover the multi-dimensional approach necessary to an adequate study of a country or culture.

Among the many methods which teachers can use are the following:

a. Through globes and maps. The location of

the Middle East is a prime factor in understanding it, and this can be done only through a wide use of globes and maps, including air-age maps. Some of the confusion regarding the many civilizations in this part of the world will be lessened, too, by the use of maps in simple historical atlases and by maps made by pupils.

b. Through time-lines. Because this area has such a long and complicated history, time-lines should be used. Especially recommended is a giant time-line to be placed on the wall of a classroom for frequent use during the study of the history of this area.

c. Through biography. The Middle East is rich in biography, and students should be encouraged to read as much in this field as possible. High school teachers might well keep in mind the several well-written accounts of Harold Lamb on men from this part of the world as well as accounts of more recent personalities.

d. Through pictures, films, and filmstrips. Because this is a "foreign" part of the world to pupils and because they cannot visit it, pictures of many kinds are a "must." Pictures in textbooks should be studied, pictures collected and mounted on cardboard, and films and filmstrips amply used.

e. Through role-playing, panels, and debates. There is no better way to "feel" as other people feel than to read and talk about them and then to try to talk and act as they might do. From the earliest years in school, children can role-play stories of children in the Middle East. And older boys and girls can play the roles of leaders or common people in this part of the world, learning thereby to understand them.

f. Through music, games, and dances. Taking part in games and dances of the Middle East or singing some of the more simple songs of that area is highly recommended, especially for younger children. But a warning is sounded that much of the music will be difficult for Western ears to understand and appreciate.

g. Through trips to art galleries and museums. Wherever possible, use should be made of nearby art galleries and museums to understand the history and contributions of the Middle East, but this should be supplemented by emphasis upon contemporary affairs lest pupils think of the Middle East only in terms of its history.

h. Through textbooks and supplementary materials. Mention of the foregoing methods does not mean that the writer is opposed to using textbooks. It means that they should be used wisely and well and supplemented or comple-

¹ For suggestions on how to study a country see "Studying Other Countries" by Leonard S. Kenworthy in the April, 1959, issue of *Social Education*.

mented by a variety of other reading materials and other experiences.

Teachers who are studying the Middle East with their pupils are urged to give careful consideration to a comprehensive and cumulative program on this area throughout the 12 years of elementary and secondary schools. There is plenty of "content" for a look at this area two or three times in the course of a pupil's school years, but elementary, junior and senior high school teachers need to consult each other on what is to be emphasized at the different levels. The emphasis in the primary grades probably should be on their peers in that part of the world; in the upper elementary grades, on ways of living; in the junior high on countries; and in the senior high schools on history and contemporary problems.

SPECIAL RESOURCES FOR TEACHERS

Most teachers developing lessons on the Middle East will want to read a few books on that area, chosen according to their own needs and interests and availability of materials. Studying the materials which pupils are going to use will provide further background. In addition to these sources, they may want to avail themselves of other materials already selected for their use.

The best such source is "A Packet on the Middle East," prepared by the American Association for Middle East Studies (738 Fifth Ave., New York 19) and sold for \$2. This contains several pamphlets, two maps, ten pages of pictures, a list of recordings and a list of films and filmstrips.

Another helpful aid is "A Selected Bibliography of Books, Films, Records, and Exhibitions about Asia" published by the United States government and sold for 25 cents by the Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.

"Studying the Middle East in Elementary Schools" (35 cents) and "The Middle East: A Resource Unit for Secondary Schools" (50 cents) and a booklet on "Free and Inexpensive Materials on World Affairs Materials" (\$1) are sold by World Affairs Materials (Brooklyn College, Brooklyn 10, New York).

A general "Reading List on the Middle East" may be purchased for 25 cents from the World Affairs Center (345 East 46th St., New York).

General Materials for Elementary Schools. A small shelf of ten books and a pamphlet on the Middle East for elementary schools would include John C. Caldwell's *Let's Visit the Middle East* (John Day, 1958), Francis Copeland's *Land*

Between: The Story of the Middle East (Abelard-Schuman, 1958), Susan Nevil's *Picture Story of the Middle East* (McKay, 1956), Vernon Quinn's *Picture Map Geography of Asia* (Lippincott, 1955), and Mary Brittain's *Arab Lands* (Holiday, 1947) as general volumes on the entire area. This shelf would also include Florence Mary Fitch's *Allah the God of Islam: Moslem Life and Worship* (Lothrop, 1950) and Azriel Eisenberg's *The Great Discovery* (Abelard-Schuman, 1956) and Alan Honour's *Cave of Riches* (Whittlesey House, 1956) on the Dead Sea scrolls. On fun and games it would include Joan Rowland's *Fun and Festival from the Middle East* (Friendship Press, 1958) and Nina Millen's *Games Around the World* (Friendship Press, 1959). Of these the writer recommends most heartily the Copeland volume for children as an outstanding book.

General Materials for Secondary Schools. Some pupils in secondary schools will need to use some of the references already listed under elementary schools while others will need to use books written primarily for adults.

There are, however, several publications intended primarily for secondary school pupils or especially suited for their use. Among these are four general pamphlets: Two of these are intended as textbooks. They are Emil Lengyel's *The Changing Middle East* (John Day, 1960) and S. Shepard Jones' *America's Role in the Middle East* (Science Research, 1958). The other two are Foreign Policy Headline Books entitled *Middle East in Turmoil* (1957) and *What the Arabs Think* (1952), both obtainable from the Foreign Policy Association (345 East 46th St., N.Y.C. 17).

The one world history textbook which treats the Middle East as a unit is Ethel Ewing's *Our Widening World* (Rand McNally, 1958).

The May, 1960 issue of *Current History* is devoted to "Progress in the Middle East" and should be an excellent source for high school students (obtainable from 1822 Ludlow St., Philadelphia 3 at 80 cents). A reprint of the special issue of *The Atlantic Monthly* on "Perspective on the Arab World" is especially good on cultural phases (obtainable from Intercultural Publications, 60 East 42nd St., New York 17, at 25 cents each for 10 or more copies). The *National Geographic Magazine* for November, 1958 has a general account on "The Arab World" which could be used profitably by many pupils.

In the field of biography Harold Lamb has written several accounts, such as those on *Cyrus the Great* and *Suleiman the Magnificent* and the

writer has recently published a volume on *Leaders of New Nations* which includes chapters on Nasser, King Hussein, and Ben-Gurion. (All three of these volumes are published by Doubleday.)

Over a period of several months, *Scholastic* magazine has printed stories of young people, including several from the Middle East. These have been printed together under the title *Young People of the Eastern Mediterranean* and edited by Charles Joy (Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1959).

On the religions of the Middle East, nearly all pupils will enjoy and profit from *Life* magazine's volume on *The World's Great Religions* (Simon and Schuster, 1958) or the Special Edition for Young Readers, both editions printed in beautiful color. Some students will also enjoy Ruth Smith's *Tree of Life* (Viking, 1942) with its excerpts from the sacred writings of several religions.

Resources on Countries of the Middle East. In addition to volumes for adults which deal with specific countries, there is some material for children and young people, which is noted here country by country.

Afghanistan. Patricia and Robert Kingsbury's small volume on *Afghanistan and the Himalayan States* (Doubleday, 1960) contains many colored pictures and a good text. This is one of the *Around the World Books*.

Arabian Peninsula. Another of the *Around the World Books* is devoted to *The Arabian Peninsula*, written by Harry Hazard (Doubleday, 1959). For children there is Clarice Pont's *No School on Friday* (McKay, 1953) and Eleanor Hoffman's *White Mare of the Black Tents* (Dodd, 1949). Much material is available free from the Arabian-American Oil Company (505 Park Ave., New York 22).

Egypt. On this nation there is much available material. Among the recent books are Jeanette Brown's tiny volume for children on *Deedee's Holiday* (Friendship Press, 1956), Arensa Sondergaard's *My First Geography of the Suez Canal* (Little, 1960), and Charles Joy's *Island in the Desert: The Challenge of the Nile* (Coward-McCann, 1959), written for upper elementary and junior high school readers. Zaki Mahmoud's *The Land and People of Egypt* (Lippincott, 1959) is the most recent volume for older secondary school readers.

Iran. General accounts of Iran include Alice Taylor's *Iran* (Holiday, 1955) and Donald Bar-

ton's *Iran* (Doubleday, 1958), a volume in the *Around the World Series*. For children there is Alice Kelsey's book of folk tales entitled *Once the Mullah* (Longman's, 1954) and her volume entitled *I Give You My Colt* (Longmans, 1956).

Iraq. The only recent reference on Iraq suitable for young people is an article in the October, 1958 *National Geographic* on "Iraq—Where Oil and Water Mix."

Israel. Of the many books on Israel special mention should be made of Nora Kubie's *First Book of Israel* (Watts, 1953), Gloria Hoffman's *Home At Last: A Story of Children in Israel Today* (McKay, 1951), Sonia Gidal's *Meier Shfeya: A Children's Village in Israel* (Behrman House, 1950), Sonia and Tim Gidal's *My Village in Israel* (Panethon, 1959), and an older volume by Evelyn Greenberg on *The Little Tractor Who Travelled to Israel* (Behrman, 1949). For junior and senior high school pupils one of the best accounts is Gail Hoffman's *Land and People of Israel* (Lippincott, 1955). A wealth of free material is available from the Israel Office of Information (11 East 70th St., New York 21).

Lebanon. There are four new references on this nation, three of them for children. These are Dorothy Blatter's *The Thirsty Village* (Friendship Press, 1958), Jim Breetveld's *Getting to Know Lebanon* (Coward, 1959), the section in the 1958 *Hi-Neighbor* book of UNICEF (U.S. Committee on UNICEF, United Nations, New York), and an article in the *National Geographic* for April, 1958 on "Young-Old Lebanon Lives by Trade." World Affairs Materials (Brooklyn College, Brooklyn 10) has two brief biographical booklets on "Charles Malik Speaks" and "Khalil Gibran Speaks" available at two for 15 cents.

Pakistan. John C. Caldwell has done an interesting volume, profusely illustrated, entitled *Let's Visit Pakistan* (John Day, 1960) which is especially good for upper elementary school pupils. For older students there are three new or fairly new books. One is Patricia and Robert Kingsbury's *Pakistan* (Doubleday, 1958) in the *Around the World Series*, a second is Herbert Feldman's *The Land and People of Pakistan* (Macmillan, 1958), and a third is Geoffrey Tease's *The Young Traveler in India and Pakistan* (Dutton, 1956). Teachers will find the "Fun and Festival from India, Pakistan and Ceylon" (Friendship Press, 1954) very helpful.

Turkey. Among the best books for children on Turkey are Marjorie Darling's *Journey to Ankara* (Macmillan, 1954), Nizabet Eye's *Turgut*

(Concluded on page 50)

Notes and News

Merrill F. Hartshorn

General Electric Foundation Fellowships

The General Electric Foundation announces that again, in 1961, 150 all-expense summer fellowships will be available for social studies teachers interested in graduate work in the field of economics. The program is set up on a regional basis, making it possible for secondary school teachers (in either public, private, or parochial schools) from 37 states and the District of Columbia to submit applications.

The fellowships provide for tuition and fees, board and room, and round-trip travel allowance. The six-week graduate-credit program will be conducted by the Economics Department of three major universities, Purdue University, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and Claremont College. Each university will award 50 fellowships. Following is a list of the states from which each university will entertain applications:

Purdue University: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and District of Columbia.

Claremont College: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.

Institutes in the Humanities

The John Hay Fellows Program will sponsor three Summer Institutes in the Humanities in July 1961. The Institutes will be held at Bennington College, Bennington, Vermont; Colorado College, Colorado Springs; and Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts.

Approximately 110 public high school teachers and 50 public school administrators will participate in these Institutes. In seminars they will read and discuss several significant books; in small classes they will study literature, history, and philosophy. There will also be special work in music and art.

The faculties of the Summer Institutes will include professors from Bennington, Colorado, Hiram, and Williams Colleges, the Carnegie Institute of Technology, and Columbia, Rutgers, and Wesleyan Universities.

The teachers will be selected from schools and school systems which are not only academically sound, but are also interested in making the best possible use of good teachers and in developing practices designed to break educational lock steps. Applicants should have had at least five years of high school teaching experience and should be not more than fifty years old. Special invitations will be sent to school administrators.

Each participant will receive \$300 for the four-week period, July 1-29, plus \$60 for each dependent to a maximum of four, and a travel allowance to a maximum of \$100 for each participant. The charge for meals and a room in a dormitory for four weeks will be \$160 for each person.

Participants in the Summer Institutes in the Humanities will come from twenty states and the District of Columbia. The states include: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.

Correspondence should be addressed to Charles R. Keller, Director, John Hay Fellows Program, 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. The final date for filing applications is February 20, 1961.

New York State Council

The Winter Meeting of the New York State Council for the Social Studies will be held at the Hotel Sheraton in Rochester, New York, February 10 and 11, 1961.

Activities on Friday afternoon will include tours to the Eastman Kodak Company and Eastman House, as well as various meetings which will take place from 4:00 to 5:30. In addition to a meeting of department heads, there will be a meeting at the Rochester Museum of Arts and Sciences which will deal with the topic, "How a Museum Serves Its Schools and Community,"

and at a third meeting a panel of teen-age diplomats will discuss "A Foreign Look at a Familiar Topic—Exchange Students' Reaction to Teaching History." On Friday evening, Dr. Albert Parry, Chairman of the Department of Russian Studies at Colgate University, will speak on "The Challenge of the Soviet Union in the Sixties."

Topics to be considered in section meetings Saturday morning include: "The Advanced Placement Program" (Dr. Henry Graf, Columbia University); "Challenge in World Geography" (Dr. Robert Hall, Jr., University of Rochester); "New and Old Problems America Must Face in the Sixties" (Dr. Richard Wade, University of Rochester); "Secondary School Testing" (Victor Taber, Chief, Bureau of Test Development, Division of Educational Testing, State Education

Department); "Reading in the Social Studies" (Dr. Roberta Fullager, New York State University, College of Education, Brockport).

At the concluding luncheon meeting on Saturday, Donald Gaudion, President of Pfaudler Permutit, Inc., will speak on "The Challenge of World Trade in the Sixties." R.U.

All social studies teachers and social studies organizations are invited to send in material for these columns. Send in notes on the activities of your school or organization and other items of general interest to social studies teachers. Mail your contributions as early as possible to Merrill F. Hartshorn, Executive Secretary, National Council for the Social Studies, 1201 Sixteenth Street, N.W., Washington 6, D.C. Contributor to this issue: Ruth Upson.

THE ECONOMICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

(Continued from page 30)

of the Middle Eastern countries themselves towards their own development. Such advancement has to be based, in order to be permanent and self-sustaining, on domestic resources. Foreign assistance can only be complementary. The lack of domestic capital in the Middle East vis-à-vis the high cost of development, so far born largely by foreign aid, presents a serious obstacle to economic progress. On the other hand, the forceful policy of public investment and the "unearned" foreign assistance create the risks of inflation. While it is now generally recognized that a certain degree of inflation is the price of economic progress, it is questionable whether the governments in the Middle East with their present predominance of political over economic considerations and their inadequate instruments of influencing capital and money markets will be able to control the pace of inflation.

PROSPECTS

The basic issue of economic development in the Middle East is of a non-economic nature. Four interacting factors have, since 1750, promoted the advancement of the West: entrepreneurial initiative; social, intellectual and technological innovations; increasing specialization;

and capital accumulation. Only the future will show whether the successful coordination of these four elements is possible only in a cultural environment with western attitudes towards work and material success that favors changes and innovations, or whether these factors, once initiated by government action, can also become effective and be sustained in a more contemplative and fatalistic society where, moreover, climatic conditions render more difficult physical efforts of the kind that is usual in more moderate zones.

What then are the prospects for economic development in the Middle East? Regional cooperation has been suggested as the panacea for the ills of the region. "Bold, new programs" may stimulate public interest and propagate the idea that national borders ought not to restrict progress. But in order to be effective, such plans have to be reduced to manageable proportions, that is to what is practicable and reasonable under present conditions. The diversities of the Middle East present formidable obstacles to regional cooperation. Hence, we should not expect miracles; on the other hand, "If the sick turn away from the doctor, how can they be cured?" asks a manual of Zen Buddhism.

Pamphlets and Government Publications

Louis M. Vanaria

Teachers as well as students learn through repetition. Let us repeat, therefore, that you may keep up to date with new government publications by receiving free a bi-weekly list entitled "Selected United States Government Publications." This circular lists the most popular new publications, with their titles, prices, catalog numbers, and brief descriptions of their contents. It is sent upon request by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. A list of 51 subject-catalogs is also available upon request, without charge.

The Middle East

Timely indeed is the recently issued *Middle East Packet* (American Association for Middle East Studies, 730 Fifth Avenue, New York 19. \$2 prepaid). Both pamphlet and audio-visual materials are included. Prices and sources of additional copies are given for the booklets, reprints, maps, films, filmstrips, photographs, and recordings that make up this convenient collection. Pamphlet titles are *The Near and Middle East: An Introduction to History and Bibliography* (AHA Service Center series); *The Middle East—An Indefinable Region* (U.S. Government Printing Office); *Iraq* (January, 1954 issue of *Focus*); *Middle East Background* (British Information Services); *A Key to the Future of the Mideast* (*New York Times Magazine*); *Perspective of the Arab World* (*Atlantic Monthly Supplement*); and *Egypt—The Youngest Republic in the World—6000 Years Old*. Individual copies of films and filmstrips on the Middle East are available at no cost from the American Association for Middle East Studies.

The Association is anxious to serve the needs of teachers and welcomes inquiries. Also available from the Association is a "Brief Annotated Bibliography on the Middle East for Secondary School Teachers," 8 p. 25 cents, compiled by Alice B. Jones, Elsie Sebert, Viva Tansey, and Edith West.

"Focus on the Middle East" is the special fea-

ture of the October issue of *INTERCOM* (Foreign Policy Association—World Affairs Center, 345 East 46 Street, New York 17, single copy, 60 cents; 6-25, each 50 cents; 26-100, each 40 cents). The Middle East issue contains reports on study materials, books, pamphlets, documents, audio-visual and speaker services from hundreds of private and official sources. Published nine months each year, *INTERCOM* is available to teachers at the special yearly rate of \$3. A special "Focus" topic is featured each month.

The "Foreign Lands Series No. 2" includes *The Middle East* (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. 161 p. 1957, 50 cents). This booklet includes information about Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

Africa Today

Carl G. Rosberg, *Africa and the World Today* (North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Foreign Relations Project, Suite 832, First National Bank Building, Chicago 3, Illinois, 66 p. 1960, 50 cents; 30 or more each 45 cents) is the most recent publication of the well-received "Foreign Relations Series." Project Director James M. Becker has good reason to hope for the wide circulation of this timely, well-organized, clearly written survey by an author who has traveled extensively through South, Central, and Western Africa. Ten short chapters synthesize the geographical and historical setting of present-day African nationalism with its implications for United States policy. Each passing day adds further evidence to the fact that we can no longer virtually ignore developments in Africa south of the Sahara. The problems of North Africa, of course, are usually associated with the Arab world and the Middle East. Says Rosberg, "American policy has stressed the maintenance of ties between Africa and Western Europe. Clearly a major challenge to the United States is how best to develop and expand economic and political links between a free Africa

and the Atlantic community. . . . At stake are more than economic and strategic considerations: The challenges of Africa are whether liberty and freedom may flourish and whether indeed the dignity and fulfillment of man may be achieved."

Limited quantities of the 4-page leaflet *Political Divisions of Africa* are available on request from the Office of Public Services, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. The listing, prepared on August 17, 1960 by the African Division of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Mid-East and Africa, gives the independent states in chronological order with date of independence, capital, area, population, former legal status, and the present chief official and title. Also listed are states scheduled to receive independence soon and other territories with their present status. A map of Africa is included for those of you who would join me in locating Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Togo, Upper Volta and other African nations that have been admitted to the United Nations. (It is interesting to note that of 99 votes in the General Assembly, Africa has 26, Asia 23, the Western Hemisphere 22, Western Europe 15, Eastern Europe 11, plus Australia and New Zealand.)

Regional Service Centers for World Affairs Materials

The following listing was prepared by Miss Jennie L. Pingrey, Chairman, NCSS Committee on International Activities.

American Association for the United Nations, 345 East 46 St., New York 17.

American Field Service, 113 East 30 St., New York.

Asia Society, 112 East 64 St., New York.

Committee on International Relations-NEA, Paul E. Smith, Chairman, 1201 16th St., N.W., Washington 6, D.C.

Foreign Policy Association, 345 East 46 St., New York; Also 421 Powell St., San Francisco 2, California; 818 17 St., Denver 2, Colorado; 127 Peach St., Atlanta 3, Georgia; and 208 Michigan Theater Building, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Foreign Relations Project, North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Suite 832, First National Bank Building, Chicago 3, Illinois.

Japan Society, 112 East 64 St., New York 21.

Science Service, Division de Interlingua, 80 East 11 St., New York 3.

The Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 45 East 65 St., New York.

World Affairs Center for the United States, U.N. Plaza at 47 St., New York.

World Peace Foundation, Boston, Massachusetts.

MURALS IN OUR MINDS

(Continued from page 46)

Lives in Turkey (Longmans, 1939), Lucile McDonald's *Sheker's Lucky Piece* (Oxford, 1941), and Alice Kelsey's book of humorous folktales entitled *Once the Hodja* (Longmans, 1953). For slightly older pupils in elementary or junior high school there is Fanny Davis' *Getting to Know Turkey* (Coward-McCann, 1957).

For junior and senior high school students there are four new volumes. These include Ali Riza's *The Land and People of Turkey* (Macmillan, 1958), William Spencer's *Land and People of Turkey* (Lippincott, 1958), Alexander Melamid's *Turkey* (Doubleday, 1957) in the *Around the World Series*, and Ray Brock's *Ghost on Horseback: The Incredible Ataturk* (Little, Brown, 1955).

A wealth of material is also available from the

Turkish Information Office, 444 East 52nd St., New York 22. Of special interest is a complete kit on Turkey sold by the International Communications Foundations (9033 Wilshire Blvd., Beverly Hills, California) for \$58, including artifacts, four color filmstrips, and study prints.

Unfortunately there is nothing of special interest to report on Jordan, Libya, the Sudan, and Syria.

Films and filmstrips. Persons desiring material on films and filmstrips on the Middle East should consult the "Sight and Sound" section of this issue, obtain the film list in the Middle East Packet referred to earlier, or purchase a "List of Films on the Middle East" from the World Affairs Center (345 East 46th St., New York 17). This list costs 15 cents.

Sight and Sound in Social Studies

William H. Hartley

A-V Materials on the Middle East

Probably the first thing you will need if you undertake a serious study of the Middle East is a real good survey film which will acquaint the students with the general nature of the area and its people. There are at least three good ones available. The Encyclopaedia Britannica's film called *Middle East* (14 minutes; rental \$5) is especially good in giving the basic geography of the region and showing typical homes and industries. Coronet has an introductory film called *Middle East—Crossroads of Three Continents* (13½ minutes, black-and-white or color). This film is divided into three main sections. The first sequence stresses the scarcity of water in this part of the earth and the steps which have been taken to overcome this scarcity. Part two shows how trade has made this an important crossroads. In part three the film shows how the rich oil deposits have made the Middle East one of the world's great strategic areas. Finally, the International Film Bureau last year (1959) brought out a general film called *Middle East* (25 minutes, color; rental, apply). Like the other two films it provides an overview of the area but, in addition, it stresses the contrasts in living conditions between the well-to-do and those who live in poverty. The need for better agricultural methods is well pictured. On the other hand, the picture does indicate the strides which have been made in recent years in industry and city housing.

After a knowledge of what is meant by the Middle East has been obtained the class will want to tackle some of the problems of the area, not with the idea of solving them, but at least to have an intelligent understanding of the issues involved. Back in 1953 the *March of Time* editors tackled the Middle East problem in an understandable fashion and much that they had to say then is still applicable. Fortunately, the film is still being distributed by McGraw-Hill. Called *Middle East—Powderkeg on the Rim of the Communist World* (26 minutes; rental, apply), this film explains the rising nationalism in Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Lebanon. It then goes

on to give a picture of their political and economic problems. The quality of the film and the way in which it stimulates students simply adds to one's regret that the *March of Time* folks are no longer active.

A more recent film dealing with the problems of the Near East is the Atlantis picture called *Problems of the Middle East* (21 minutes; color; rental, \$10). After introducing the geographic setting in a highly acceptable fashion, the film proceeds to analyze the issues involved in the conflict between Israel nationalism and Arab unity. The problem of minority groups on both sides is explained. This film also stresses the need for education of the common man, and for the development of better agricultural methods.

The Arab-Israel Question (15 minutes; rental, apply) is the title of a film by Almanac. This is largely a discussion-type film in which an expert on Middle East affairs discusses the problem with a representative of the Syrian-Lebanon American Federation.

Another discussion type film is the NET *Life Today in the Middle East* (29 minutes; rental, \$4.75). Representatives of Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon discuss the tension between the Arabs and the Jews. Scenes show the military build-up on both sides.

There are two films which do a good job of explaining how the Middle East affects our foreign policy. The first is the Encyclopaedia Britannica film, *Planning Our Foreign Policy* (21 minutes; rental, \$4). In a convincing manner this film traces the steps taken by a United States committee which is charged with investigating, analyzing, and making recommendations concerning our Middle East policy. Economic, political, military, and psychological elements are explored and a tentative program of action is planned. The second film was originally produced for television and is distributed by the World Affairs Center for the U.S. It is called *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East* (29 minutes; rental, \$8). The scenes and the commen-

tary show how we are involved in the economic life of the Near East and how we have had to take steps to protect our citizens and their investments abroad.

Finally, in seeking good films for use in a unit on the Middle East, we came across one called *How Can One Nation Help Another?* Our first reaction was against any film with a title as naive as this one. Then we noted that this film was produced by NET (National Educational Television) and these gentlemen are not naive educators. So we looked into the matter further and found here a film which will not only interest but will help to educate high school students. The film (29 minutes; rental \$4.75) shows a discussion taking place between a group of teen-agers from Turkey, Israel, United Arab Republics, and Iran. As we listen in on these youngsters telling of the economic and political problems of their homelands and as we see both differences and many problems which are similar we can not help but agree with the students when they conclude that there should be means by which these countries could work together.

If you want a good filmstrip around which to build a good discussion, get hold of *The New York Times* strip called *Near East Powder Keg* (sale, \$2.50). It's several years old, but it is still

one of the best summaries of the situation that we have available.

Sources of A-V Material on the Middle East

To order any of the films listed here write directly to the producer. In some cases the producer does not rent his films, but he will tell you the address of the nearest educational film library which distributes his films. The addresses of producers whose films are listed above are:

- Almanac Films Inc., 516 Fifth Ave., New York 36.
- Atlantis Productions Inc., 7967 Sunset Blvd., Hollywood 46, California.
- Coronet Instructional Films Inc., 65 E. South Water St., Chicago 1.
- Encyclopaedia Britannica Films, Inc., 1150 Wilmette Ave., Wilmette, Illinois.
- International Film Bureau, Inc., 57 E. Jackson Blvd., Chicago 4.
- McGraw-Hill Book Co., Text-Film Dept., 330 West 42nd St., New York 36.
- NET Film Service, Indiana University, Audio-Visual Center, Bloomington, Indiana.
- New York Times, Office of Educational Activities, 229 W. 43rd St., New York 17.
- World Affairs Center for the U.S., U.N. Plaza at 47th St., New York 17.

WORLD IN TRANSITION

(Continued from page 8)

of the Salaha of the earth is as much our responsibility as it is theirs. What we do, or fail to do, will in large part determine whether in the future these young people are to be our friends or our enemies. What we do, or fail to do, will in large part determine whether they turn to communism or commit themselves to the values of the free world.

Viewed in this perspective, the experiment now going on in Saudi Arabia is as important in terms of the future as anything now happening on the face of the earth. It is one thing to extract oil from the earth and use it as a source of energy to lift the age-old burden of toil from the back of mankind. It is something else again for peoples of two utterly different ways of life to live side by side in full respect and understanding one of the other.

In the years to come, the partnership in Saudi Arabia may well stand as one of the great

achievements of free enterprise and the democratic way of life. If so, this will be because those who are carrying on the experiment have wisdom and understanding of the highest order, and because they have the support of men and women who, although not directly involved in the experiment, are learning to accept the responsibilities of citizenship in a rapidly changing world.

We are using Saudi Arabia as a concrete example of an infinitely larger problem, one that involves our relationship with all of the as yet uncommitted peoples of the world. Like it or not, their fate and ours are inextricably joined. Nothing less than wisdom and courage and statesmanship of the highest order, from the top levels of our government down to the least among us, will enable us to meet successfully the grave challenges confronting us now and in the troubled years that surely lie ahead.

—LEWIS PAUL TODD

Book Reviews

Daniel Roselle

I. THE MIDDLE EAST

There is an old Middle Eastern proverb, translated into English by Herbert Howarth and Ibrahim Shukrallah, about a hunter who went killing sparrows one cold day. As he carried on the slaughter, the hunter's eyes filled with tears. One sparrow, more sensitive than the rest, turned to another and said: "Look at the man crying." The other answered: "Never mind his tears, watch his hands!"

In its relation with the countries of the Middle East, the United States has both responsibilities: first, to be sensitive to the plight of the peoples of the Middle East; and second, to recognize that these same peoples can hold in their hands a potential threat to peace. To encourage this double awareness, the Book Department devotes its entire section this month to reviews of books about the Middle East.

Our featured book is *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* by Walter Z. Laqueur. It is reviewed by Nasrollah S. Fatemi. Dr. Fatemi served during 1938-43 as Mayor of Shiraz and as Governor-General of the Province of Fars. He was a member of the Iranian parliament and represented Iran in the United Nations. During 1950-55 he taught at Princeton University, and at the present time he is a member of the faculty in the Graduate Division of Fairleigh Dickinson University.



The Soviet Union and the Middle East. By Walter Z. Laqueur. New York: Frederick Praeger, 1959. 366 p. \$6.00.

By Nasrollah S. Fatemi

Russia and Britain have long been rivals in the Middle East. The "bear that walketh like a man" has not loved the lion and the lion has not wished to lie down with the bear. Their old rivalry originated on the border of India and deep inside Iran and the Ottoman Empire, where the two Big Powers have frequently clashed. Russia's ceaseless drive for access to southern climes and warm seas has played a dominant role in her history, but always blocking the fulfillment of her expansionist dreams

has risen a wall—yesterday, England; today, the United States.

The Communist Revolution intensified but did not alter the basic Russian policy. As early as 1918, the Communists assigned a precise role to Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan; and the Communist writer, K. Kroynovsky, pointed to Iran as the key to the coming revolution in the Middle East and Asia. At the 1920 Baku Congress of Eastern Peoples, Grigori E. Zinoviev, addressing 1,891 delegates, declared: "We must here and now declare a true holy war against the English and French robber-capitalists." In his Manifesto to all the Muslims of the East, Lenin called upon them to side with Russia "to overthrow the despoilers and enslavers of your countries." In May 1920, Bolshevik troops invaded Iran and set up the Communist Government of Gilan and Mazanderan.

The first appeal for help from the League of Nations came from Iran. In October 1920, Lord Curzon, frightened by Middle East events, presented Russia with his now historic ultimatum, demanding that Bolshevik agents desist from further hostile propaganda in the East. Throughout the 1921-1941 period, Iran and Turkey were subjected to Soviet sabotage and other subversive acts. During the Nazi-Communist courtship of 1939-1941, Molotov proposed a deal to Hitler in which the Soviet Government was prepared to accept the draft of the Four Power Pact, regarding political collaboration and reciprocal economic support, provided that "the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, by means of long-term lease," could be assured and that "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union."

In 1941 Soviet troops occupied northern Iran; in 1945 they set up the Communist government of Azerbaijan; in 1946, in violation of their agreement with Britain and Iran, they refused to evacuate northern Iran. It is an irony of history that the first case to come before the United Nations Security Council, as it had been before the Council of the League of Nations, was the

complaint of Iran against Soviet Russia. In 1945 Russia increased her pressure on Turkey, demanding return of Kars and Ardahan, and revision of the Montreux Straits Convention. At that time the Truman Doctrine saved both Turkey and Greece; but nine years later, in 1954, to the surprise of most Western diplomats, Russia leaped over Dulles' "Northern Tier" to establish, for the first time in history, a foothold in the Arab world.

This dramatic and continuing story of a major Russian drive for power and position is the subject of Mr. Laqueur's book, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*. The book is timely; but unfortunately it provides a cursory coverage of Big Power relations, zigzag Communist strategy, and complex and complicated Middle East politics. The author in his research relies mostly on Russian and Western newspapers. He seems to have little knowledge of the diplomatic literature available in London, Washington, Paris, Moscow, and the Middle East countries, and little acquaintance with the new Middle East.

The section of the book dealing with Comintern policy towards Palestine is the best. The part concerning Iran and Afghanistan is sketchy, confusing, lacking in essential historical fact, and frequently erroneous. The disproportionate section devoted to Arab countries repeats at random speculations and Western newspaper reports. One thing is certain: the author is not impartial in his view regarding Arab countries. President Nasser of the United Arab Republic is his *bête noire*. Discussing reform in Egypt, the author writes:

Regimes such as Colonel Nasser's had also declared themselves in favor of democratic socialism, but the similarity of terms by no means indicated that they had the same thing in mind. Political rather than economic considerations were ultimately decisive; the desire to attain a position of political and military strength, rather than the wish to engage in welfare-state economics, to pursue gradual reform and balanced development. In these circumstances the appeal of quasi-Communist solutions was bound to be powerful.

The author regards Nasserism as a potpourri of the French revolution, Bonapartism, Peronism, solidarism of Othmar Spann, Salazarism, Islamic socialism of Khaled Muhammad Khaled, and an Asian version of Marxism. "In addition, there is an invocation of the spirit of Bandung, a few quotations from Aneurin Bevan, the 'genius of the national revolution,' and the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*."

The book contains some mistakes which could be avoided. For example:

- Jangai (p. 29) means man of Jangal, not "Forest Brethren."

- Kheyabani (p. 32) was anti-Communist and had no association with the Russians. There is no confusion about his uprising and the author should have consulted Iranian authors on this subject. The man who led the Tabriz Communists was Lahuti, who later escaped to Russia. He is called the "poet of the revolution."

- Reza Khan (p. 46) was not responsible for the dismissal of the foreign military advisers; it was Mushir-ud-Dowleh and, later, Seyyid Zia-ud-Din Tabatabai who denounced the Anglo-Persian Agreement and sent the British advisers home.

- Bachah Saqqa (p. 49) was not a "military leader"; he was a notorious bandit.

- There is no evidence that Amanullah Khan ever received a "yearly grant" from Moscow (p. 48).

- Reza Khan (p. 45) only stayed behind the scene for three months, not for "some years." He became minister of war and commander-in-chief of the armed forces in 1921. From his first day in office he was the sole ruler of the country.

- The statement (p. 113), "only toward the very end of that period, in 1945-46, was a fresh attempt made to extend Soviet influence in the Middle East," is inaccurate. In 1941 Soviet troops occupied Iran; in 1942 the Qazvin border was closed to everyone, including Iranian officials; in 1944 Kavtaradze, deputy commissar for foreign affairs, was pressuring the Iranian government for oil concessions in northern Iran; at Yalta, Stalin and Molotov were so certain of their domination of Iran that they refused even to discuss the case of Iran with Roosevelt and Churchill; and in 1945 the Communist government of Azerbaijan was created. Communist pressure on Turkey and Afghanistan began as early as 1939. In 1940, Soviet Russia asked Germany to agree to the establishment of a Russian naval and military base within the range of the Dardanelles and to recognize the Middle East as the center of the aspiration of Soviet Union.

- Chapter five on Soviet trade and economic aid contains no original research and very little information. Many of its figures cannot be verified and do not accord with the Arab or the United Nations sources.

- The statement (p. 298) that "the national government" in Egypt has borrowed so heavily from Communist propaganda "that the dividing line had become increasingly blurred" is not in accord with available information,

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• The Iraqi *coup d'état* (p. 346) was not "just two years" after the Egyptian revolution: it came six years later.

• On page 176 the author declares: "Of all the great world religions, Islam is perhaps the least dangerous rival from the Soviet point of view." Yet on page 56 the author contradicts himself by stating: "But the relationship between Communism and Islam is more complicated than in the case of other religions. Islam is not only a religion but also was, at any rate until fairly recently, a way of life. Liquidating Islam does not mean merely closing places of worship, but involves abolishing an entire social system, with its manners, customs, laws, and specific way of life. This peculiarity of Islam was recognized by the Communists; in its resolution on the need for atheist propaganda, the Twelfth Party Congress noted that for a variety of historical and social reasons the influence of Islam in Russia was stronger than that of the Orthodox Church." On page 177 the author also states: "During the summer months of 1954, anti-Islamic propaganda was stepped up; there were frequent appeals 'to raise the level of scientific, atheistic propaganda,' hundreds of meetings were convened in which the harmfulness of Islam in general and such specific obligations as the fast, in particular, were denounced."

• The author's prophecy (p. 358) that the Iraqi Communist party was "a political problem of decisive importance" and that it would emerge as a major factor has never materialized; the Iraqi Communists at this juncture have little or no significant influence.

The Soviet Union and the Middle East reveals little basic understanding of the modern Middle East. The continuing moral and spiritual power of Islam and the dynamic human drama of the region fail to emerge in this account. The author implies that Nasser's military and political ambitions opened the door to Communist Russia—a simplification, to say the least, of the over-all situation. No one reason, group, or event can shape the history of an area so vast and so vital to the peace of the world. If I may be permitted a generalization, I should say that the Communist penetration of the Middle East derives from three major factors: (1) the West's disregard of the aspirations of the common people and its alliance with the hated kings and their lackey politicians; (2) the insistent demand throughout Asia and Africa for political, social and economic reforms; and (3) the impressive growth of Russia's

military and industrial power. Since 1953 the Soviets have shifted their tactics, but not their basic aim, which remains constant and consistent. Everywhere they capitalize on unsatisfied yearnings and support revolutionary efforts. Too many Western observers make the tragic mistake of equating legitimate demands for reform with Communism. Nasser, Qassem, Mussaddeq, Bitar, and all the other nationalists are branded as pro-Communists and anti-West. The status quo seems to be the guiding star of Western strategy. It is a strategy of inevitable surrender to Communism in its impact on the minds and hearts of the people in the Middle East. As an editorial in *The New York Times* of August 27, 1960, pointed out: "If we cannot provide social justice with freedom and by evolutionary process, the Communists, who falsely promise it through revolution, will win."



II. BOOK FARE

Studies Honoring Dr. Hitti

The World of Islam. Studies in honour of Philip K. Hitti. Edited by James Kritizek and R. Bayley Winder. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960. 372 p. \$7.50.

This assemblage of serious and carefully written studies of various aspects of the Islamic world should serve as a powerful antidote to the sentimental idea that understanding another culture is primarily a matter of good will. An impressive scholarship and a wide-ranging knowledge are displayed by the contributors, and the net result is sobering. If so much effort is necessary to identify threads in the carpet, then who can discern the pattern?

As the title indicates, the book is a collection of studies written by scholars who were former students of Dr. Philip K. Hitti of Princeton University and published as a tribute to that great scholar and teacher. The contributions, which are marked by a spontaneous quality, seem to have fallen naturally into the three sections that divide the book: Islam and its antecedents, the world of medieval Islam, and the modern Far East. There is also a brief biographical sketch of Dr. Hitti (probably the most distinguished figure in the field of Islamic studies in this country), together with an impressive bibliography of Dr. Hitti's books and other publications.

Considering the purpose of this work, the concept of its editors, and the fact that the contribu-

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tions were written spontaneously, to call the book uneven and disjointed would be manifestly unfair. The general reader should be warned, however, not to expect each of the studies to fall into place in a meaningful whole. In addition, perhaps in tribute to the peaceable nature of the famous scholar to whom the book is dedicated, there is an absence of controversial material. True, the British Foreign Office and the League of Nations do not come off well in Dr. Joseph's discussion of the Assyrian question, but then neither does the last 'Abbasid caliph in Professor Kritzek's analysis of a work written in 701/1301-2; and the sins of all three seem equally remote in time in our era of nuclear fission.

Taken together, the studies provide a mine of information of a kind which all too frequently is lost in the deluge of superficial journalistic efforts to "interpret" what is happening in this or that country of the Middle East. For example, the collection contains an excellent survey of what is now being published (and presumably read) in Iran together with an analysis of who is doing the reading and what influence the readers are likely to have on the future of that country. Then there is an ingenious description of a

method by which philately, particularly in Islamic studies, may be used as an ancillary device for drawing conclusions concerning a country's "history, economy, culture, population and aspirations."

Each section in the book contains at least one study which is certain to prove of interest. For this reviewer, the most outstanding contribution was the imaginative essay in the field of comparative religion by Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith, the distinguished Islamicist of McGill University. Different chooser, different choice—of course!

It is unfortunate but undoubtedly coincidental that no contributor concerned himself with any Muslim society east of Bahrein; this is a fact, not a criticism. For the sake of consistency the editors chose to use the form of transliteration of Arabic used by Professor Hitti in his major works; thus the uninitiated may fail to recognize Jamal 'abd-el Nasr and Ibn Rushd as President Nasser and Averroës.

Although the volume is primarily a collection which will appeal to the well-grounded Islamic scholar, there are many studies in this work which would add greatly to any teacher's fund

of knowledge. The book will stand as a fitting tribute to the life and work of a great man, Dr. Philip Hitti.

JOSEPH E. GOULD

State University of New York
Fredonia

The New Egypt

Nasser's New Egypt: A Critical Analysis. By Keith Wheelock. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960. \$6.00.

The *coup d'état* of 1952 which brought Gamal Abdel Nasser to power in Egypt was both the expression of currents of change which had grown out of the second world war and the Palestine war of 1948, and the cause of a new set of circumstances which have drastically altered the course of international affairs. And so a real understanding of that coup and of the effects of it is absolutely crucial to an understanding of the Middle East and of much of Afro-Asia.

In writing this study of Nasser's new Egypt, Mr. Wheelock has done a significant service. Much of his material is based on personal interviews with the leaders of Egypt, and his account is best described as a fusion of excellent journalism and careful scholarship. He has set out the underlying social and economic factors behind the *coup d'état*—small increase of industry, lower yield of agriculture, rapidly increasing population, juxtaposed vast wealth and horrifying poverty, a weak and corrupt government and a growing middle class—but he has not neglected the personal element in politics. His analysis of Nasser, in his struggle with Naguib and in his dealings with the Communists and Muslim Brotherhood as well as with Russia and the West, is shrewd and tough-minded. The reader is able to follow the development of the unpopular young army officer who "was determined to demand sacrifices from his people rather than offer them the 'bread and circuses' so often promised by previous regimes" to the Nasser of the Suez War and "positive neutralism." What emerges is a realization of the shallowness of newspaper clichés which so often substitute for analysis and act as a cover for ignorance.

As Mr. Wheelock points out, "the phenomenon of military regimes replacing civilian governments throughout the Afro-Asian world is of urgent concern to the West and to the Communists alike." These new regimes are not in accord with our political expectations but they are ac-

ceptable and perhaps needed by their own people; they are significantly different from the military dictatorships we have known in Europe (for, among other reasons, they are "progressive" rather than retrogressive in creating new societies). If we are all to survive, we must do so in a pluralistic "one world" and must come to understand the Nassers of Afro-Asia. In this quest for understanding, Mr. Wheelock has given us an excellent model of the sort of study in which we are in critically short supply.

WILLIAM R. POLK

Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Harvard University

History of the Middle East

The Middle East: A History. By Sydney Nettleton Fisher. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1959. 650 p. \$8.95 (Text edition \$6.75).

In *The Middle East: A History*, Sydney Nettleton Fisher presents an historical account of one of the world's oldest cultures in one of the crucial geographical areas of our times. By means of the brief geographic prologue, the reader is provided with a picture of the geographic-socio-economic setting necessary to a realistic understanding of the turbulent developments in the centuries since the Arabianization of the region.

Beginning with a brief review of the rise of the early civilizations, the rise and fall of ancient empires, and pre-Islamic political development, the author treats with authority (a) the rise and dominance of the Islamic culture over a vast geographical area, (b) the rise and dominance of the Ottoman Empire, (c) the advent of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European imperialism in the area, and (d) the contemporary political and socio-economic developments that characterize the modern Middle East. In his book, Professor Fisher has omitted no development having significant impact on the Middle East of the twentieth century.

Running through this history of the Middle East is the invisible thread which warns that the degeneration of empires was the inevitable consequence of the absence of long-range planning for social and economic development. Professor Fisher forecasts the nature of things to come when he suggests that the Middle Eastern "culture, skills and civilization must be understood and appreciated and their desires respected."

The Middle East: A History combines understanding with logical organization and readable style. If the author's purpose was to provide the

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student and the scholar with a basis for real understanding of the events of modern times in the Middle East, he has done his job well.

KERMIT A. COOK

West Virginia University

Middle East Economy

Middle Eastern Capitalism. By A. J. Meyer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. 161 p. \$3.75.

A. J. Meyer, Associate Director of the Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, has drawn upon his eight years of experience in the Middle East as professor, administrator, economic consultant and (in the summer of 1950) Director of the Gaza Strip, to present nine thoughtful essays about the economy of that area.

He begins with a survey of the economic progress, problems, and prospects of the various countries involved; and then offers a set of thought-provoking historical analogies with European and American economic development. Later essays deal with the role of entrepreneurship in the past and future economic growth of the Middle East; and there are case studies of Cyprus, of land reform in Turkey, and of the role played by the oil companies in promoting local industry. The essentially conservative outlook of Middle East economic planning is stressed. The author claims that "despite its plans the Middle East is in some ways more capitalist than the industrial East it strives to overtake." He concludes by stressing the need for reshaping western economic doctrines, policies, and "points of view" if the West is to find ways to know and to live better with the Middle East.

Social Studies teachers and others who wish to know more about the Middle East and the complexities involved in economic planning will profit by reading this book.

ABRAHAM SONDAK

Forest Hills (N.Y.) High School

Nasser and the Revolution

The Philosophy of the Revolution. By Gamal Abdel Nasser. Buffalo, Economica Books, 1959. 102 p.

This book represents an effort by the publishers to present the principal elements of Gamal Abdel Nasser's views on the Egyptian revolution, supplemented by descriptive and evaluative statements by four non-Egyptians. The main body of the short volume is an abridgment of

a translation by an Egyptian, Dar Al-Maaref. The editor states that about one-fifth of the original essay, consisting chiefly "of repetitive or rambling passages, or of occasional passages on medieval Egyptian history," has been omitted. Dr. John S. Badeau, formerly President of American University in Cairo, points out in the Introduction that the importance of *The Philosophy* lies largely in that it is a source document on the origins of the revolution and provides us with insights into the character of Nasser. The reader will be interested in Nasser's account of some of his actions as a young revolutionary, his mental turmoil in that role, his ambitions for Egypt and the Arabs, and his antipathy for imperialism and Zionism.

In the Appendix, John Gunther has contributed an interesting biographical note on Nasser and Naguib. Richard D. Robinson, lecturer at Harvard, has written an evaluation of Nasser and his record; while George Kirk, also a lecturer at Harvard, has contributed a statement on Arab nationalism and its relationship to the Egyptian revolution.

This volume should prove to be useful and interesting reading for high school and college students. *The Philosophy* is written simply and interestingly, and the observations in the Introduction and Appendix emphasize and amplify the significant features of the essay.

W. L. GRUENEWALD

Ball State Teachers College
Indiana

Jordan

Jordan: A State of Tension. By Benjamin Shwadran. New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959. 436 p. \$7.00.

This is, in essence, a case study of a neutralist country where American foreign aid (\$40,500,000 in 1959-1960) serves our national interest. Because this book is meticulously detailed, it is sometimes difficult to follow the story; but this detail makes it a valuable reference work. Its sweep is considerable, for the history of the Jordan River Valley is surveyed from earliest times to the present. The volume's major theme is the security of the region relative to the outside world. Therefore, since Jordan is currently a vital entity in the international struggle in the Middle East, the author discusses security problems in the entire region.

Despite the book's detail, its omissions are significant. There is little reference to the Arab

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refugees or to economic conditions in the country, although both affect the nation's security. The author also has a tendency to make unsupported generalizations. He states, for example, that the original purpose of the 1958 revolution in Iraq was to incorporate that country into the United Arab Republic. This seems dubious.

However, the author's insights constitute a valuable feature of the book. His distinction between Arab and Western Nationalism is particularly challenging and ought to spark much class discussion and research.

JAY V. GROVES

West Virginia Wesleyan College

Turkey

Turkey and the World. By Altemur Kilic. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959. 224 p. \$4.50.

Mr. Kilic provides an annotated chronicle of Turkey's foreign relations, concentrating on their development since the revolution of Kemal Ataturk. The author writes in an easy style, and his enthusiasm and knowledge of his subject make the account an exciting drama.

Modern Turkey, more than any other country

on the edge of the Iron Curtain, is perhaps in the most crucial position in the struggle between East and West. The defense of the Eastern Mediterranean in the face of Russian imperialistic expansion is not new to Turkey. Undeveloped, misunderstood, and treated with scorn by the great powers, Turkey succeeded in a democratic revolution and established her right to a position as an equal in the councils of the Western powers. Similarly placed nations can well emulate Turkey's courage and realistic determination to achieve such a well earned place in the world.

Mr. Kilic has provided a sorely needed concise account. It is a "must" for those interested in the modern political scene.

DALTON POTTER

American University at Cairo

EXPLORING THE ELEMENTARY BOOK FIELD

By Jane Ann Flynn

Theme: "The Middle East"

My First Geography of the Suez Canal. By Arensa Sondergaard. (Little, Brown and Co., 1960. \$3.50) (Grade 3-5)

Though the title does not indicate it, there is

historical emphasis in this book on the long felt need for a canal and the struggles to build it. The description of a ship's passage through the canal helps the reader to visualize the actual operation of the waterway. Colorful pictures are of interest, but maps could be more informative and placed in the book to better advantage.

My Village in Israel. By Sonia and Tim Gidal. (Pantheon, 1959. \$3.50) (Grades 4-6)

Another interpretation of a country through the everyday life of a child. Samuel lives in a Kibbutz, a collective settlement in Israel; and the activities of a few days in spring—study at school, work, play, as well as the celebration of the Passover Festival—present a good picture of the people and their lives there. Picture map of the village on end papers will be of interest, as will the glossary and the many fine photographs.

Getting to Know Israel. By Charles R. Joy. (Coward-McCann, Inc., 1960. \$2.50) (Grades 4-6)

A more informative book about Israel than the Gidal book, this volume gives a broader view of the various parts of Israel, of the nation's precarious position in the Middle East, and of the life of the people. There is also some background material on the development of the new nation and its problems. Illustrations, glossary, and index are included. The Gidal book and Joy book supplement each other and could be used together effectively with younger readers interested in Israel.

Getting to Know Lebanon. By Jim Breetveld. (Coward-McCann, Inc., 1959. \$2.50) (Grades 4-6)

An overview of this small country in the Middle East. The people, their land, their occupations, and their activities are described briefly. There is little material available about Lebanon, so this book is a welcome addition. It will be useful in developing for children a realistic concept of life in the Middle East. Similar in format to other books in this series.

Desert Caravans: The Challenge of the Changing Sahara. By Charles R. Joy. (Coward-McCann, Inc., 1960. \$2.75) (Grades 4-7)

As the author explores nine ideas about deserts (such as the "desert is all sand") and points out facts and fancies about these ideas, the reader is given an accurate general picture of a

desert. Then the Sahara—its past, present, and possibilities for the future—is discussed in a vivid fashion. This is a brief book but its sound content, good photographs, and glossary will add much to the child's understanding of the Sahara.

Other Books of Interest

Let's Visit the Middle East. By John Caldwell. (John Day, 1958. \$2.95) (Grades 4-8)

The Land Between. By Frances Copeland. (Abelard-Schuman, 1958. \$3.) (Grades 4-8)

The Arabs. By Harry B. Ellis. (World, 1958. \$2.95.) (Grades 6-8)

The Land and People of Turkey. By William Spencer. (J. B. Lippincott, 1958. \$2.95) (Grades 6-9)



III. BRIEFS

The Middle East 1959. Europa Publications Limited, 1959. (U.S. Distributor: International Publications Service, 507 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, New York.) 491 p. \$13.50.

This is the seventh revised edition of a very useful and dependable reference work on the Middle East. It includes: (a) An essay on the physical, social, and economic geography of the Middle East as a whole. (b) Geographical, historical, and economic surveys of each country. (c) Brief descriptions of the systems of government, law, education, and religion in each country. (d) A directory, including the names and addresses of newspapers, commercial organizations, and universities. (e) A "Who's Who in the Middle East"—biographical information about the leaders in the Middle East. Concise and logically organized, *The Middle East 1959* is a valuable reference book.



The Middle East in Transition. Edited by Walter Z. Laqueur. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. 513 p. \$8.75.

An outstanding collection of essays on political and social trends in the Middle East. Part I, "Social and Political Change," includes articles on Arab unity and dissensions; the middle class in the Arab world; Pan-Arabism; and Arab nationalism. Part II revolves around the theme of "Communism, the Soviet Union, and the Middle East." Written by distinguished specialists, the essays are a rich source of information about the Middle East. Many of the selections give added confirmation to editor Laqueur's statement:

While a knowledge of the history of the Middle East is

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of great value towards the understanding of current tendencies in that area, it is not the only, nor always the most important, prerequisite. When all is said and done, the problems of the Middle East today are much more similar to those of, for instance, Indonesia, Indo-China, or of some of the Latin-American countries than to those of eighteenth-century Syria or Egypt.

▼
The Changing Middle East. By Emil Lengyel.
 New York: The John Day Company, 1960.
 376 p. \$5.75.

The most recent work by the author of *World Without End: The Middle East and Egypt's Role in World Affairs*. Writing in a style that is already familiar to the readers of his many books, Professor Lengyel here focuses on the basic problems that dominate the shifting scenes of the Middle East. His book probably will be of greater interest to the general public than to the highly specialized scholar on the Middle East.

▼
Turkey. Introduced by Lord Kinross. Photographed by Yan. Descriptive commentaries and notes by Robert Mantran. New York: The Viking Press, 1959. 302 p. \$14.00.

A beautiful book of 305 illustrations in photogravure, plus several highly informative maps, plans, and charts. Here are striking photographs of Turkish life—pictures of public scribes stoically plying their trade behind the Mosques; sturdy wrestlers preparing to compete in *yaghli guresh* (the traditional form of Turkish wrestling), their skins still wet with oil poured over their bodies; and an old Anatolian peasant whose wrinkled face conjures up a vision of Job. Here, too, are photographs of the rug-covered prayer hall of the Ala ed-din Mosque at Konya; the Tomb of Mevlana Djelal ed-din Roumi, whose splendor makes one believe in the magic of Aladdin; and many other unusual scenes. The price of the book may seem high—unless you are in the mood to break that paperback buying habit!

▼
Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp. Edited by Niyazi Berkes. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. 336 p. \$5.00.

Selected writing of Ziya Gökalp, the teacher-sociologist-poet who dedicated himself to the creation of a modern Turkey. Although Gökalp, died in 1924, his statements still are among the best expressions of the view that Turkey can

build a Western civilization and integrate it with its own Turkish culture.

▼
Foundations of Israel—Emergence of a Welfare State (Anvil Books—Number 41). By Oscar I. Janowsky. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, Inc., 1959. 191 p. \$1.25.


Not all of the books in the Anvil Paperback Series are sufficiently sturdy to withstand the hammer of critical review. This one is! Professor Janowsky's volume is a clear and effective interpretation of the history of Israel before World War I to our own times. Chapters on "Population Problems" and "Welfare-State Ideals" are particularly informative. The 28 readings in the second part of the book—especially the statistics on immigration, population, economic growth, composition of governments, and the revival of Hebrew as a living language—are useful complements to the text.

▼
Oil and State in the Middle East. By George Lenczowski. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960. 379 p. \$6.75.

A study of the complicated problems that develop from the relationships between foreign-owned oil interests and the state in the Middle East. The book discusses the history of oil concessions in the Middle East; the interactions between the oil industry, the governments, and the people; and the significance of the Suez Canal crisis. It is particularly commendable in making clear that economic problems cannot be separated from the political and social web of the Middle East.

▼
The Ancient Near East: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures. Edited by James B. Pritchard. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. 380 p. \$6.00.

A fine collection of documents of the ancient Near East that add to the reader's understanding of biblical peoples and their writings. The volume includes Egyptian myths and tales; epics from Mesopotamia; legal texts; Assyrian and Babylonian historical texts; Palestinian, Canaanite, and Aramaic inscriptions; and Akkadian and Aramaic letters. Almost two hundred primary source illustrations enrich the presentation of documents. The wide margins in the book were provided for scholars who wish to add their own observations to an already excellent volume!



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